ASSESSING EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF SECURITY
EVOCS DELIVERABLE 3.1

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
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ABSTRACT

The core objective of the Evolving Concept of Security (EvoCS) project is to offer a clear yet detailed overview of security concerns that exist in different regions of the European Union. A proper understanding of these concerns is vital to both effective and representative priority setting in European security policymaking. The results of the EvoCS project are therefore intended to be directly relevant to security policy makers and security research and development planners at the European Commission. The EvoCS project also offers a general model, which relies on a combination of quantitative and qualitative inputs, to assess regional and temporal variation in security concerns in the future. This document sets forth the analytical framework guiding the research conducted in the EvoCS project. It elaborates on the vision, introduces key methodological concepts and describes operational research guidelines. Accompanying this document is an online repository which is only accessible to members of the Consortium. Policymakers interested predominantly in the background of the EvoCS project need not read more than the introduction. The methodologically inclined reader who would like to know more about the research design of a project stretching twelve countries and executed by four different research teams, might wish to read the document in full.
INTRODUCTION

The European project was initiated to end the frequent and devastating wars between European countries. The idea was that economic interdependence and shared prosperity would lead to greater political stability and security. After the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) expanded rapidly. In 2013, 62 years after the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Union welcomed its 28th member Croatia.

The EU now comprises a diverse set of countries and peoples, which is rooted in different historical orientations, geographical circumstances, sociodemographic compositions, and security perceptions. Commonality of interests continues to be a key driver of the European project. Yet diversity has undeniably become a core characteristic of the Union. At the EU level this poses new difficulties for establishing common security policies that address shared security challenges and do justice to different European security concerns. A clear understanding of these concerns is vital to both effective and representative priority setting for security policies, including research and development activities in fields such as natural hazard mitigation, cyber privacy, crisis management, and border control.

Precisely to facilitate the development of EU security policies that meet security concerns across all Member States, the EU FP7 project “Evolving Concept of Security” (EvoCS) was conceived of and funded by the EU Commission.

The overarching objective of EvoCS is to come to a better understanding of different European security concepts and the salience of their respective core values, actors, levels, security challenges (threats, hazards, risks), and ethical and human rights issues. The very nature of security concepts can be assessed by looking at how different political actors across Europe prioritise different core values and perceive different risks, how they address them at different levels, and how they give different levels of attention to different problems across time.

This increased understanding should provide input to assess whether EU planning and research priorities in the security domain are reflective of the regional security concepts or whether some of these are underrepresented or omitted altogether. The objective of EvoCS is therefore to elicit different regional concepts of security in such a way that:

• the findings can be used as input by security stakeholders such as security policy makers and security R&D planners at the Commission (including Strategic Advisory Group);
• the findings can be used as input for other Commission co-funded projects;
• the project serves as a model of how to periodically assess these evolving concepts of security.

The present document, which is the official Deliverable 3.1 (D3.1), sets out the analytical framework. The analytical framework guides the assessment of these security concepts across Europe in the EvoCS project in four different regional case studies. The assessment of these concepts runs in two stages. In stage 1 the regional case study teams will employ the same approach to systematically elicit concepts of security from different sources (government, parliament, academia, media, the private sector and NGOs). In stage 2, the regional case study teams will analyse the results from stage 1 in desk research and a series of workshops held around Europe in early 2015 (see Figure 1).

In the present deliverable the research protocol for stage 1 is described in elaborate detail. In so doing, it introduces an understanding of concepts of security
• by defining their most important characteristics,
• which are assessed by identifying measurable indicators,
• which are created by coding pieces of evidence from a variety of sources.

The protocol begins by setting out a vision for how concepts of security are defined, including the various characteristics they consist of, and how to assess whether they are important. The research design that will govern the creation of the quantitative indicators is then presented, before offering individual descriptions as well as a coding framework for the pieces of evidence. The document proceeds by reflecting on the cross-comparability of different country results and suggests a number of good practices for normalisation (at the country level) and aggregation (to the regional level) of the results. Finally, a description will be provided on how the research activities in stage 2 can build on the research results from stage 1, in addition to describing the content and format of the final report of the four regional case studies.

Figure 1 Research Program of the EvoCS Project
1 VISION
1 VISION

The first step in this project is to set out how concepts of security can be envisaged and to describe the various dimensions of which they consist. The very subject matter of a concept of security must first be defined. We therefore start off with a discussion of security and securitisation and identify the building blocks, which together make up security concepts. Later we talk about how these security concepts vary over time and across different regions. Having coined the meaning of a security concept, the term salience is introduced to explain how we ascertain the extent to which a security concept is prevalent, important, or indeed, salient for the purposes of our project. Greater details are then provided on the specific building blocks or characteristics of security concepts, in the process offering definitions and descriptions.

1.1 SECURITY AND SECURITISATION

This research project is about security and therefore must limit the scope of discussion to securitised matters—issues which in various discourses are conceived of as security concepts. In other words, it only exists (or does not exist) in the experience and therefore perception of people. Against this background, this project neither sets out to create a universal definition of security nor does it attempt to identify purported ‘real’ risks that affect security. Thus it is recognised that in some cases there may be a complex and interesting relationship between what some would call actual (‘objective’) rather than perceived (‘subjective’) security risks, however these aspects are not included with the scope of this study. Rather, we assume that definitions of security can and will vary across different political actors and across time, as well their appreciation of its importance. This project looks at security discourses, in which multiple actors use claims and actions such as statements and speeches to contribute to shared understandings of what security is (or is not) about. Our dependent variable then is an entirely subjective notion of security. We are chiefly concerned with perceptions (see Figure 2).

The term concept of security refers to an overall notion of what the term security encompasses. Each concept of security has characteristics which set it apart from others, based on different dimensions. These five dimensions are its core values, the political actors involved, the types of security challenges (risks, threats and hazards) affecting these core values; the levels at which security is protected; and the ethical and human rights issues which present themselves in this process. The dimensions together form a concept of security at a specific moment in time.

These concepts can vary across regions and evolve over time. What we are looking for in this regard is how the importance of each dimension evolves, relative to the importance of the others. In order to assess the importance of a given dimension, we introduce the term salience, which is a more refined notion that helps in gauging the relative importance of these dimensions to the actors involved.
Figure 2 Creating Concepts of Security

1.2 SALIENCE

To capture the nuances in how far a given concept has currency within a given country, we introduce the term salience. Salience is a debated concept in social sciences, and no commonly accepted definition exists. We conceive of salience as the importance political actors attach to an issue as a function of the degree to which they experience a problem in relation to the issue at hand. Two important considerations underlie our use of the term. The first is that we need more precise terminology when thinking about prioritising security issues (see 1.2.1). Secondly, we need a more refined methodology in ascertaining salience (see 1.2.2).

1.2.1 SALIENCE: IMPORTANCE VERSUS PROBLEM

When considering priorities amongst concepts of security, the most straightforward way may be to simply focus on the problem that is deemed most important. In the academic literature, this starting point is sometimes referred to as the “most important problem (MIP) question”. However, further distinctions need to be made to operationalise the notion of salience.

Salience as a term distinct from ‘importance’ can be illustrated by way of an analogy using health instead of security. The liver is vital to one’s overall health, so in a sense it is of paramount salience. This form of salience can be referred to as ‘importance’. But the liver features more prominently in some people’s consideration of their health than in others’, for example when their liver is at risk of damage or failure. This form of salience can be referred to as ‘problem’. Importance will likely change little, or only very incrementally, over time, is generally roughly similar for many forms of security for most countries, and may not gain much public visibility (as, for example, the day-to-day activities of the military in peacetime). In contrast, problems do vary over time, and between countries, and are often more visible because of the attention that is afforded to them.

Another key distinction to make is between the individual and communal levels, or, what is called in the academic literature, sociotropic versus personal salience. For instance, when asking someone the question “what is the most important problem or issue?” they can provide an answer that relates to the country as a whole, or one that concerns their own personal situation. In general, problems reflect humans’ perceptions of what the pressing issues are—we generally occupy ourselves with changes, risks, and inequalities more than...
we occupy ourselves with whether the issue areas that they concern (say, physical safety, or the environment) are generally important.\textsuperscript{11} In this project, salience is therefore conceived of as the degree to which there is a problem in relation to the issue at hand based on the perceptions of different actors.

1.2.2 ASCERTAINING SALIENCE: SOME CRITERIA
‘Importance’ and ‘problem’ are two aspects that frame the notion of salience. In order to ascertain which issues are ‘salient’, social scientists have come up with different interpretations.

The first, called the ‘classical view’ posits that salience can be identified and measured by looking at how the position of an individual on a given security issue diverges from the ideal position that other individuals take on the same issue\textsuperscript{12}. In this respect, the classical view helps to identify salient security issues, but does not take into account the larger context of these issues, nor does it explain why a given individual has picked a particular issue as salient.

This problem is partly addressed by second different theory called ‘valency’ which looks at the relative importance of a security issue in comparison to other issues (whether security-related or otherwise).\textsuperscript{13} One issue with this view is that it considers problems in a static rather than dynamic way; it assigns salience in the abstract against other priorities. Thus, it assumes a fixed ‘importance’ level of each dimension of security for a given country, rather than a dynamic ‘problem’ level which interacts with the situation facing that country. For example, a particular person considers that territorial and physical security are both important, yet they would, if required to do so, prioritise one over the other. This is called ‘valence.’

A third way of looking more specifically at this issue of prioritisation in a more dynamic fashion is called the ‘price interpretation’.\textsuperscript{14} This strand of thought proposes that in order to gauge the salience of a specific security value for a given individual, we do not only consider their weighing of various values, but also consider the distance to the status quo position (which the classical view is built upon). This informs the extent to which an individual is prepared to trade off one value against another. In short, the price interpretation combines the classical view and the valence interpretation. An example of this would be if a given person cares more about, say, seeing that petty crime would be punished more severely than combating white-collar crime, although within society, there might be more support for the latter rather than the former. Price interpretation then looks at the trade-off that a person is willing to make in order to move towards the status quo.

In the methodology section, some guidelines will be presented for operationalising the idea of salience.

1.3 CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND THEIR DIMENSIONS
With concepts of security and salience defined, we now turn to the various constituent dimensions of security which we will look at in this project. These dimensions are summarised in Figure 3.
1.3.1 CORE VALUES
Core values refer to the different aspects of life that actors seek to make secure. A wide range of European government and academic publications on security define particular types of security which we can consider core values. They include physical safety and security, territorial integrity and security, environmental and ecological security, social stability and security, cultural identity and security, political stability and security, information security, and economic prosperity and security. The varying degree of salience for each core value is of crucial importance in comparing the prevalent concept of security in different countries. This section offers definitions of the core values identified in this project, and explores some ways in which each core value could become salient.

PHYSICAL SAFETY AND SECURITY
Physical safety and security are the part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard the physical integrity of systems, spaces, objects and human beings. It could therefore concern both individuals and groups of individuals, as well as the infrastructure they depend on.

Physical security gains salience if a breach has occurred, is perceived to have occurred, or is perceived to be imminent or probable. Breaches of physical security may include anything responsible for premature deaths, human suffering, or destruction or degradation of critical assets. Concrete examples include severe flooding, virulent epidemics, chemical accidents, terrorist attacks, but also local street attacks, domestic violence, forced labour, torture, and inhumane treatment.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY
Territorial integrity and security is the part of security concerned with measures to safeguard sovereignty of the state over its territory from hostile invasion and other external threats. It relates to Westphalian concepts of state sovereignty and borders. As such, threats to territorial integrity and security can materialise outside of a nation’s borders, but to be assessed as such will have to be explicitly framed as having a disruptive impact on a country’s territorial integrity and security.

Some nations perceive their cyber space infrastructure as part of their territory and frame cyber attacks as breaches of territorial integrity and security. Cyber security relates to the uninterrupted functioning of information and communication technology systems, the protection of confidential communications, and related matters.

Breaches of territorial integrity and security may include foreign invasion, defection of government authorities such as the police or military in a particular area, or degradation of territorial assets to the point that they become unusable. Breaches of cyber security may include hacks and large-scale attacks against critical infrastructure. Further breaches (which are of particular relevance from an ethical and human rights point of view) may arise in the attempt to defend territorial integrity and security such as the restrictions and
violation of fundamental rights for specific groups (suspected terrorists, refugees, migrants, asylum seekers, separatists, religious and ethnic minorities).

ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECOLOGICAL SECURITY
Environmental and ecological security is the part of security concerned with measures designed to provide safety from environmental dangers (including diseases) caused by natural or human processes due to ignorance, accident, mismanagement, or intentional activity. This value concerns specific social aspects of environmental protection and their importance within the security management process. It may include the preservation of nature, its functioning and its wildlife.

Breaches of environmental security may include natural degradation and natural disasters caused by climate change, including droughts and floods. They may also include damage caused by humans, such as deforestation, pollution, poaching, chemical accidents, and nuclear meltdowns. Other breaches (which are of particular relevance from an ethical and human rights point of view) may include a lack of or a failure in protecting, preventing and empowering the safety of individuals and societies (through early warning, risk monitoring, disaster preparedness, resilience, education, relocation and reconstruction after ecological disasters, for example).

SOCIAL STABILITY AND SECURITY
Social stability is one of the least well defined of the core values and therefore likely to be used in different ways across different countries. However, it does merit inclusion as the social interactions of people and the security issues that can emerge from these interactions are pervasive. They are a quintessential element of perceptions of security reported by people in their everyday lives. It is also sufficiently analytically different from the core values cultural identity and political stability, which are further defined below.

This form of security includes undisrupted social order, low levels of crime, participation in social and economic activity, peaceful coexistence of different groups (ethnic, religious, class, or otherwise), adequate education, and a number of other things.

Breaches of social stability and security may include mass civil disobedience, ethnic violence and widespread crime. Other breaches (which are of particular relevance from an ethical and human rights point of view) may include a failure to enhance social rights and social protection for all categories to the same extent (for example ethnic communities or the elderly).

CULTURAL IDENTITY AND SECURITY
Cultural identity and security is the part of security concerned with measures designed to safeguard the permanence of traditional schemas of language, culture, associations, community identity, peaceful coexistence and religious practices while allowing for such bonds to evolve. This value has a strong interrelationship with social stability and security as it affects social cohesion, the level of social and communitarian vulnerability and collective resilience.

Breaches of cultural identity and security could include discrimination of particular groups by the government or certain people or groups in society; abridgement of cultural or group rights; or socioeconomic phenomena or policies that adversely impact particular cultural groups. Of particular relevance to ethics and human rights are breaches endangering the value of pluralism or diversity and freedom of religion, or cases of hate speech, racism, xenophobia and homophobia.
POLITICAL STABILITY AND SECURITY

Political stability and security is the part of security concerned with the protection of established institutions, acquired rights, and recognised policy choices. It entails the absence of threats to these institutions, rights and choices as well as the absence of fear that such institutions, rights and choices could be impaired. If fully functional, a stable and legitimate political order invariably ensures free and fair functioning of political processes; efficacious, accountable, transparent, and inclusive decision-making as well as popular legitimacy. It may overlap with the core values of social stability and security and territorial integrity and security.

Breaches of political stability may include coups d’état, widespread electoral fraud, large-scale corruption and large-scale civil disobedience. Of particular relevance to ethics and human rights are breaches endangering the freedom of assembly, association, right to good administration, transparency of procedures, or widespread phenomena such as corruption, lack of trust in institutions, and lack of integrity of political parties.

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND SECURITY

Economic prosperity and security is the part of security concerned with socioeconomic measures designed to safeguard economic and social systems, their development and their positive impact on individuals. The focus is limited to those economic phenomena which are securitised. It includes a smoothly functioning of the international and the national economic system based on a commonly acknowledged rule-based order, unfettered access to international trade and resources, secure sea, land, and air lines of communication and the absence of large scale economic corruption.

Breaches of economic security affect one or more of these aspects. They can include beggar-thy-neighbour trade and monetary policies, industrial espionage and intellectual property theft, severe economic stagnation, large scale unemployment (especially youth unemployment), hyperinflation, and large national budgetary deficits that undermine the functioning of public institutions. It may also include brain drain.

1.3.2 PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY: SOURCES AND POLITICAL ACTORS

Tracking security perceptions of different political actors is essentially a multi-layered process. First, there are different sources in which a security discourse takes place. Second, these sources discuss different actors.

We have selected a number of different sources to ensure that we approach the problem from more angles by including sources that reflect concepts of security from a variety of perspectives. Our sources are:

- Government
- Parliament
- Academia
- Media
- Private Sector
- NGOs

These sources are chosen because they report statements that are political in nature. By this, we do not mean that they are uttered by politicians, but rather that they provide contributions to public debates about concepts of security which in themselves are subject to political decision-making. Hence, political actors are those actors whose statements, perceptions and actions have a distinct impact on how salient concepts of security are shaped. The sources listed above are assumed to reflect a wide spectrum of societal security discourses in a given country.
In order to unpack perceptions of security, we distinguish between four categories of actors: **addressors, addressees, the object actors** that are being affected, and the **subject actors**. Differentiating between these categories is instrumental in capturing perceptions of different political actors on the role of other actors in affecting (either negatively or positively) core values.

With **addressor**, we mean the actor—whether the government, an NGO, a business, a citizen, or other identifiable entity—who expresses itself explicitly on a given security issue. The **addressee** is the actor to whom the statement of the addressor is directed. The **object actors** are those who are impacted by the security problem in relation to a given core value. The **subject actor** refers to the actor who is responsible for the threat. See Figure 4 for further clarification.

To give an example, a media article reports how a civil community leader calls upon individual citizens to help reintegrate disenfranchised youth who have returned from the Middle East (where they have fought in Syria and Iraq) in order to prevent them from perpetrating terrorist attacks against public facilities. The source here is media. The addressor is the civil community leader, the addressee is the individual citizen, the object actor is the general public, and the disenfranchised youth are the subject actor.

Another example is a parliamentary document reporting on a politician who is calling on the state to deploy air power in the Middle East to target religious extremists because they pose a threat to the physical security of national citizens. Here the source is parliament, the addressor is the politician, the addressee is the government, the object actor are the citizens, and the subject actor are the religious extremists.

1.3.3 POLITICAL LEVELS

Political levels are the different spaces, locations, and opportunity structures in which political actors take action. We take political levels into account because it reflects the level on which actors call for action to be taken, which might be different from the level at which the actor normally operates. If we stick to our previous example of the returning ‘jihadists’, then the civil community leader singles out the local level as the appropriate level for action. The politician identifies the international level. The levels we distinguish between are:
1.3.4 ETHICS & HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights and ethics are often considered in separation from security, as if they were mutually exclusive or even incompatible; as if the pursuit of security could and should be achieved without respecting fundamental rights and ethical principles. Yet, human rights and security are two cornerstones of the European system. For instance, the European Union internal and external security strategies are founded upon and targeted to the promotion and the protection of human rights. Fundamental rights can be fully enjoyed in a secure, enabling environment. Moreover, the very respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights contributes to shaping security as human and multidimensional, thus fuelling a virtuous circle. Finally, it is precisely thanks to the philosophical and ethical reflection of the last centuries that notions such as human rights were conceived and developed through the lens of certain concepts (such as universality, equality, individuality, human fulfilment), that were practically operationalised into corresponding ‘normative’ claims. Ethics and human rights are therefore inherent to security and have contributed, in the course of the last seventy years, to expanding the conceptualisation of security from a state-centric Westphalian logic into one that centres on human security. The ethics and human rights perspective provides researchers with a lens enabling them to analyse, with a critical eye, whether the security and securitisation discourse (along with the related perceptions) by different sources, at various levels, takes into due account human rights and ethics. The rationale of such framework is the concept of security as human-centred based on the recognition that every human being is entitled to human rights and therefore to freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

1.3.5 SECURITY CHALLENGES (THREATS, HAZARDS AND RISKS)

Security challenges are phenomena that are perceived to threaten one of the core values of security. Concretely they include any phenomenon that is qualified as a threat, hazard or risk. Since these three concepts are distinct, but often used interchangeably in various popular security discourses, we opted not to differentiate between them. Instead we consider them under the heading security challenges. Since we are looking at perceptions of security, we are interested in the perceptions of political actors and not in whether or not these perceptions confirm with the finer and more correct analytical distinctions made in the literature. In stage 2 of the research project, during the qualitative analysis of the research results of stage 1, they can be dissected again.

Threats, hazards, and risks are similar concepts that have a distinctly different meaning. Threats, hazards, and risks detail potential harm to someone or something, but they differ in the intent they ascribe to that harm and the probability of that harm occurring. A threat is a “potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or activity of an intentional/malicious character.” Note that in order for potential harm to be qualified as a threat there needs to be intent or malice on behalf of the person or organisation posing the threat. Here it differs from a hazard, which is non-directional in nature. Secondly, there is no element of chance involved: a threat or hazard is present or it is not. This is where risk comes in.
Risk is the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences.” In this definition risk does not (only) take into account intent or malice, but does look at the weaknesses of the target of the risk. A small attack on a weak target might pose a greater risk than a large scale attack on a heavily fortified base. Secondly, it takes into account the possibility of the harm materialising by looking at the chance the incident takes place in the first place and multiplying this with the chance the attack causes damage. Although threats, hazards and risks are thus distinct concepts in the literature, in popular discourse they are used interchangeably. As such, we have opted to use a qualitative measure to extract the perceptions of threats, hazards and risks from the different sources. We ask coders to briefly summarise the threats, hazards and risks identified in these sources. The aggregate of these hazards, threats and risks can then at later stage be text-mined or can be analysed manually to present the most pertinent threats and risks.

1.4 REGIONS
The regional axis is important as we anticipate that different perceptions of security exist in different regions of the European Union. These different perceptions will be driven by the geographical situation, history, culture, and social conditions. We will focus our attention on four European regions that we expect to be sufficiently different from each other and yet as a whole generally representative for various security concerns in the European Union:

- West-Mediterranean EU: Italy, Malta, Spain
- Eastern EU Boarder: Poland, Hungary, Latvia
- North-Western EU: United Kingdom, Netherlands, France
- South-Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Turkey, Serbia

Overall we have aimed to construct the four regions so as to arrive at a broadly representative sample of the EU and some of its close neighbours. To this end we have included countries from different geographical clusters, with different levels of economic development, different security concerns and different cultural backgrounds. We simultaneously made sure to include countries on both ends of the spectra identified above, so as not to base our sample on one case.

More specifically we also considered the language abilities our partner institutions have in house. Most of the sources we use to identify the concepts of security will be written in the vernacular language of the country and so language abilities, and some familiarity with the tradition and procedures of the countries and their academic scenes were crucial selection criteria for us.

Please see Figure 5 for a map of the four different regions and the specific countries within those regions.
1.5 TIME
The salience of security concepts varies over time. Assessing the evolution of concepts of security requires us to gauge these concepts at different moments in time. The analytical framework is explicitly designed to capture such fluctuations. Given the necessity of prioritising limited resources, it has been decided to assess contemporary concepts of security in stage 1, and concisely describe the historical trajectories in which these concepts came about in a more qualitative manner in stage 2. The focus of the analysis of the historical context in stage 2 is on the recent past, between the present and a decade ago.

1.6 CONCLUSION
Our vision for this project begins with viewing concepts of security as socially constructed and securitised. These concepts can have a number of defining characteristics, which we refer to as dimensions. The dimensions can vary over time and across the four regions in the perceptions of different actors. All the dimensions together form the concept of security at a specific moment in time. Understanding different concepts of security means uncovering which characteristics define them because of their salience. Salience is defined as the extent to which a security issue is considered a problem.
2 METHODOLOGY
2 METHODOLOGY

Having laid out the overall approach for the project, we now turn to the general methodological principles guiding the gathering of data. This chapter reflects the same structure as the previous one, dealing first with how we can determine whether securitisation has taken place, second with how to determine whether particular dimensions are present, and third with how to evaluate their salience.

The goal of this methodology is to bring together (1) the vision of securitisation, dimensions, and salience with (2) the process of gathering and coding evidence.

All of our data will be manually coded. We have chosen this approach because variables such as securitisation and salience are difficult to capture using automated processes. The result of the coding will be in a uniform, systematic format, centrally located in a single database which all research teams will get access to. This has advantages in terms of ease of use for researchers, coordination between different research teams, and data handling after coding is complete.

In order to overcome inconsistencies and biases associated with human coding, the following golden rules must be applied throughout the coding process:

1. **Only what is explicitly mentioned should be coded. No inferences made by the coder should be included.** As we are coding perceptions of security it is of paramount importance that we are capturing the perceptions of the actor we are coding, not the ones of the coder. As such the coder should disregard everything but the exact written text of the source. Should the coder applies their own judgment to the coding, they will misrepresent political actors.

2. **Our unit of analysis is the creation of concepts. Pieces of evidence are therefore examples of the securitisation process in their own right.** The validity of claims, the implications of statements, and the potential consequences of actions are not of interest to this research and should be ignored. This golden rule fits in the same category as the previous one; we can only code those things that are explicitly mentioned. If a parliamentarian proposes to disband the border police, this is likely to have implications for territorial security, but unless the source text explicitly mentions these implications we cannot code them. This golden rule is included to avoid the perceptions of security of the coder to become intermingled with those of the actor to be coded.

3. **Only domestic concepts of security are of interest. Evidence of securitisation which does not affect the country coded should be ignored.** This golden rule exists because we are interested in capturing national perceptions of security. This does not mean that we exclude international issues, it just means that those issues need to be perceived as having an impact on the country under consideration. A newspaper article just mentioning the security threats ISIS poses in Syria will not be coded by the Serbian coders, but an article mentioning how ISIS can pose a security threat to Serbia or actors within Serbia will.

In order to overcome inconsistencies and biases associated with technological and regional differences, a further rule is in order: **when using Google Search at any point in the coding process, always ensure you are browsing in a private browser window (incognito in Chrome).** Google infamously keeps track of searching patterns to tailor results. These preferences bias our sample. By using a private browser we can improve the standardisation of our toolkits.
2.1 SECURITY AND SECURITISATION

The first thing to determine when analysing pieces of evidence is whether they contain an act of securitisation.

In order for securitisation to take place, the piece of evidence must contain an articulation or reflection of one or more concepts of security, for example in a policy document, a piece of legislation relating to security, or a newspaper article. Therefore, we will analyse only pieces of evidence where there is an explicit reference to security (or similar terms such as risk or threat). Hence for example, the economy may be extremely salient to political actors within a country, but to be relevant to this study it must be salient as a security issue, and articulated or acted upon in that sense. The first question to appear in the coding form therefore is whether or not the item to be coded deals with security or securitisation (see below). This question is mostly there as a check, a ‘no’ answer will cancel the input of this piece of evidence into the code form.

Does the item deal with security or securitisation?

- Yes
- No

Securitisation is an act, and must be articulated as such. We are therefore interested only in political claims\(^{30}\) which create or reflect concepts of security. We go beyond speech acts by including other actions such as calling summits, mobilising troops, participating in boycotts, publishing letters, creating social media content, and so on.\(^{31}\) We analyse only pieces of evidence where there is “purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors”.\(^{32}\) Hence for example politicians frequently talk about issues pertaining to the economy, but there generally is not a securitising claim and therefore nothing to code. Only if a piece of evidence contains an actor highlighting the need to bolster the economy or prevent a recession in the name of security can that piece of evidence be coded.

2.2 SALIENCE

Each dimension of security will be coded according to its salience in the piece of evidence. Importance as a criterion is already covered by virtue of the core values that are preselected.

The extent to which something is a problem is difficult to capture qualitatively; however our analysis can still take account of whether a problem is of focal or of secondary concern. Based on political claims, we differentiate between three basic degrees of salience: main topic, mentioned, and absent.
• **Main topic(s)** means that the piece of evidence is primarily about a particular dimension of security. There can be more than one main topic, if the piece of evidence is primarily about multiple core values. There can also be no main topic coded, if the piece of evidence is primarily about a non-security issue, but mentions security issues as secondary topics.

• **Mentioned** means that the piece of evidence is primarily about some other issue, but nonetheless contains acts of securitisation. The key is that the issue has to be spoken of in a security-related context. So, if a piece is mainly about a police operation, but also mentions an environmental issue but not in a securitised manner, then it should not be recorded.

• **Absent** means that the case being analysed has no reference to a particular core value.

### 2.3 DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

This section deals with how we will look for evidence of dimensions of security within the pieces of evidence coded. It mostly deals with questions of what does and what does not constitute evidence for one dimension. In the next chapter we will provide detailed coding instructions for each source of security. See below a quick refresher on the dimensions of our study; the full definition can be found in the previous chapter.

#### 2.3.1 CORE VALUES

Core values should be coded by salience as main topic, mentioned, or absent. Coders should ignore previous knowledge and experience when looking for evidence of core values. If more than one core value is referred to, then there can be multiple main topics or topics mentioned. If no core values are explicitly mentioned, then all core values should be coded as absent.

For example, an article about a forest fire might explicitly mention breaches of physical and environmental security—these should be coded as ‘main topic’ or ‘mentioned’. The coder may know from elsewhere that the fire also causes severe financial distress—but unless this economic impact is mentioned then economic security would be coded as ‘absent’.

Given the complexity of the concept of security and securitisation, some salient issues fall into several core values. In order to ensure methodological consistency, researchers need to conduct a semantic analysis in order to assess if a given salient issue which is inherent to several core values (such as flooding, terrorism, or chemical accident) is to be considered, in the examined piece of evidence, as related to one core value or another (or multiple core values). This is of key importance in order to assess whether some core values are perceived as linked to ethics and human rights if compared to others. Examples of salient issues falling into several core values:

**Flooding** can fall into three core values:
- physical safety and security: flooding may cause preventable death, human suffering, displacement and related consequences.
• environmental and ecological security: flooding may lead to severe, irreversible environmental damage.
• territorial integrity and security: flooding may lead to degradation of territorial assets and their consequent inaccessibility or usage.

**Terrorism** can fall into two core values:
• physical safety and security: terrorism threatens the life and security of people experiencing a terrorist attack;
• territorial integrity and security: while on the one hand terrorism threatens territorial integrity and security, on the other hand measures to counteract, prevent terrorism may lead to restriction and violation of fundamental rights of terrorists or suspected terrorists.

**Chemical accidents** can fall into two core values:
• physical safety and security: chemical accidents threaten the life and the health of people
• environmental and ecological security: chemical accidents may have very serious, irreversible, detrimental effects on the environment and ecosystem.

**Minorities** can fall into two core values:
• social stability and security: the presence of cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. minorities (and the related “diversity”) can be perceived as a menace to social stability, especially when taking decisions on public expenditure for social protection as means for avoiding inequality and for enhancing the social cohesion.
• cultural identity and security: the presence of cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. minorities (and the related “diversity”) is an opportunity for enhancing the ethical value of pluralism. The related threats derive from issues, such as hate speech, racism, discrimination, xenophobia.

2.3.2 PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY: SOURCES AND POLITICAL ACTORS

Different political actors, with different perceptions of security, will feature in each piece of evidence across different sources, and should be coded according to their role in the creation of concepts of security.

For type of sources we distinguish between the type of source which can be government, parliament, academia, media, the private sector or NGO. We elaborate in greater detail on the selection of sources in the next section.

Political actors can be either addressors, addressees, object actors or subject actors. Because it is close to impossible construct a comprehensive taxonomy for subject actors up front, we have created a text box in the coding form which we ask researchers to concisely record the subject actor. For the other three types of political actors, we have created a taxonomy of the following political actors:

• **National government**: this is the domestic national executive branch of government. Ministerial statements, official publications, actions by government agencies such as police, and mobilisation of the military could all contain acts of securitisation where the national government is an addressor.

• **National parliament**: this is the domestic national legislature. Parliamentary speeches and party manifestos are examples of evidence that could contain acts of securitisation.

• **Regional and local state bodies**: the regional and local bodies of the executive and legislative branch of government.
• **European Union**: any EU institution such as the Commission or the Parliament.

• **International institution**: any international institution whose members are governments, such as the UN or NATO. (the European Union is coded separately).

• **Media**: journalists are usually not an addressor, rather they report other people’s perspectives. Journalists can be addressors, but only if the explicitly state their own opinion in, for example, an op-ed or an editorial.

• **Private sector**: corporations that trade goods and services for money, employer organisation.

• **Academia and research institutes**.

• **Civil society**: NGOs, pressure groups, pundits, social partners, trade unions, and grassroots organisations.

• **General public or individual citizen(s)**: remember only to code these if the individuals are speaking on a political platform and contributing to discourse on security.

• **Foreign government**: any branch of government from abroad. Remember only to code this if the foreign government is explicitly mentioned as an addressor or addressee of the security discourse within the domestic country studied.

Remember: only explicitly mentioned political actors should be coded, and only actors affecting or affected by domestic security should be coded. For example, a journalist may have written a news article, but unless the journalist contributes their personal opinion, the journalist should not be coded.

Remember: only political actors who affect or are affected by security within the country are coded. For example the Dutch team would code the Dutch government’s actions in response to MH17, but the Polish team would not, unless an explicit reference to Polish security was made. In another example, the German team would code an article that talks about the NSA allegedly tapping the phone of Angela Merkel, but it would not code an article talking about the alleged infringement on the privacy of US citizens, unless once again an explicit reference to German security was made.

2.3.3 POLITICAL LEVELS

Like the previous two dimensions, we code the extent to which different levels of political action are the main focus, mentioned, or absent. More than one level can be the main focus, mentioned, or absent. This is of particular interest for federal countries, and countries which cooperate closely with their neighbours. The purpose of this exercise is not to make comparisons between the different levels, or to aggregate lower levels so as to arrive at conclusions about higher levels. Each level is thus examined at its own merits.

Only when an actor or claim is explicitly mentioned in the piece of evidence should its level of organisation be coded. For example, a Dutch national port security policy may affect Rotterdam more than it does Maastricht, but unless specific cities or provinces are named, the Dutch government and ports are conceived at the national level and should be coded as such. Six levels are possible:

• **Local**: the local level, including villages, communes, towns, cities, and grassroots organisations.

• **Subnational**: the subnational level includes the regional level, the provincial level and the state level. This may be especially relevant for some countries, such as Germany.
(with its Länder), Spain (with its comunidades autónomas) and the United Kingdom (with its four nations). These are all coded under this category. Also possible under this definition are the French régions and départements and the Dutch provinces.

- **National:** the national level.
- **International:** the international level. This refers to bilateral or multilateral relations affected by or affecting the country studied. Be sure here only to code political actors from the country studied, or foreign actors which affect or are affected by securitisation in the country studied.
- **Transnational:** the transnational level refers to more than two countries whether in the same geographical area or not, which can refer both to the European Union in its entirety, to the regions dealt with in the EvoCS project, and to groups of countries which are geographically close and form a unit in one way or another such as for instance the Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg).
- **Global:** here we refer to security matters affecting or affected by the whole world, including, of course, the country studied. For example: when politicians refer to climate change as a security issue they generally envision this problem to exist on a global level.

### 2.3.4 ETHICS & HUMAN RIGHTS

The ethical and human rights dimension codes the extent to which human rights and ethical principles explicitly feature within the examined piece of evidence. Table 1 (see below) has been designed to support researchers in their analysis. Column 1 refers to the core values, Column 2 to the salient issues intrinsic and related to each core value and Column 3 to the most relevant ethical and human rights principles (twelve keywords).

Guidelines to conduct the research on the human rights and ethical dimension:

- The researcher should search if, in the examined documents, the ethical and human rights principles are mentioned as related to specific claims about security. There is no hierarchy among the selected twelve ethical and human rights principles.\(^{33}\)

- The research should produce an outcome in terms of the following three codes: main topic if ethical and human rights principles are the primary focus of the piece of evidence; mentioned if they are present; absent if there is no consideration of ethical and human rights principles.

- Following this coding and on the basis of the outcome, the researcher should produce a pondered assessment along two lines:

  - As to the sources of security: to assess the extent to which human rights and ethical principles are equally taken into account in the security or securitisation discourse of different sources, or if for instance some sources disproportionally make reference or, on the contrary, do not make any reference to human rights and ethical principles compared to other sources.

  - As to the core values and intrinsic, related salient issues:\(^{34}\) to assess the extent to which human rights and ethical principles are mentioned in relation to a given core value (and its intrinsic related salient issues) in the security or securitisation discourse. For instance, researchers should assess whether the documents showing human rights and ethics as “the main topic” regard all the core values in the same way or disproportionally refer to one or two in particular. Or again, they should report whether documents where reference to human rights and ethical principles is “absent” regard a given core value.
On the basis of this assessment, the researcher may want to insert some final comments and considerations for the country considered. In the framework of the Ethical Monitoring and Information Service (EMIS), researchers may require support to SSSUP for guidance regarding issues that may arise during the research.

Relevant Human Rights and Ethical principles that are considered are:

- right(s)/human right(s)/fundamental right(s);
- ethic* (ethics, ethical)
  - dignity
  - non-discrimination/non discrimination
  - human security
  - autonomy
  - privacy/integrity
  - equality
  - liberty/freedom (of assembly, of association)
  - transparen* (transparency, transparent)
  - universal* (universal, universality)
  - equality/diversity (as a value)

Table 1: Ethical and Human Rights Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORE VALUE</th>
<th>SALIENT ISSUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical safety and security</strong></td>
<td>- violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- domestic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- forced labor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- physical and mental integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- premature death(s) / human suffering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- severe flooding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- virulent epidemic(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- chemical accident(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- terrorist attack(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- local street attack(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- torture and inhuman treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Integrity and Security</strong></td>
<td>- terrorist(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- suspected terrorist(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- foreign fighter(s)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- asylum seeker(s)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- irregular migrant(s) / immigrant(s)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- minorit* (minority, minorities)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- cyber security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- foreign invasion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- defection of government authority/ies in a particular area</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- degradation of territorial assets</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- flooding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political stability</strong></td>
<td>- government duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- large scale corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- trust (in institutions)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- longevity (of political parties)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- independent authority/ies</td>
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<td>- coherence of law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- free and fair functioning of political processes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- efficacious, accountable, transparent and inclusive decision making</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- popular legitimacy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- electoral fraud</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social stability</strong></td>
<td>- social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- austerity measure(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- social expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- crisis (economic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- vulnerable (vulnerability of) groups/categories (the elderly, the unemployed, ethnic minorities, the disabled, pregnant women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- infrastructural failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- undisturbed social order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- widespread crime</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- participation in social and economic activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- peaceful coexistence of different groups (ethnic, religious, class or otherwise) or, instead, violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- civil disobedience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- widespread crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2.3.5 SECURITY CHALLENGES (THREATS, HAZARDS AND RISKS)

This dimension looks at the security challenges facing a country. It will be manually coded, and then either text-mined by computers or analysed manually. It is therefore not necessary to write a detailed analysis of the piece of evidence being analysed. Nor is it necessary to explicitly mention specific core values, unless they are already included in the text.

Coding security challenges also allows us to examine in more detail what is perceived to cause national perceptions of security. If our analysis shows that territorial security is salient in Italy we can use the results of this coding effort to specify what threats, hazards and risks are related to that.

Text mining tools are sensitive to sentence structure and collocation. But also in case we opt to analyse this section manually it will be of great assistance to the coders if the sentences are clearly formatted and easily readable. Therefore the following points are important:

- Write in full sentences
- Try to incorporate as much information as possible
- Be terse—try to express the meaning in just one sentence per risk, BUT
- Use language that looks and feels natural. The sentences must make sense on their own, without the context of the piece of evidence they are drawn from.

A good general rule would be to translate sentences from the text analysed and supplement it with clarifying words and phrases. For example, it may be necessary to replace pronouns (such as ‘it’) with the names of their antecedents. In the following examples, most of the text has been copy/pasted; highlighted parts have been added to supplement the text. Quotation marks are used in the examples to show that the text has been pieced together from fragments in the original evidence. It is not necessary to use any punctuation in the coding form.
Please present all text in English. Generally, text-mining software supports a limited number of languages, and yours may be excluded. All text from a given country must be in the same language, so English is usually the easiest common denominator.

- “Examples of potential threat triggers are: accident at a chemical plant, a terrorist attack with biological or chemical weapons, large-scale rioting, Srebrenica scenario.”
- “The risk of flooding with far-reaching consequences has grown.” “The risk of drowning should be one in 100,000 years.”
- “The unease that migration generates is to a large extent anchored in the fears of politicians about losing control over their territorial borders.”
- “Amsterdam airport Schiphol has installed new security scanners, which check passengers for dangerous items in their baggage.” “America fears that jihadists could board flights with explosives that are difficult to trace.”
- “The safety of forensic researchers cannot be guaranteed. There is still fighting between the Ukrainian army and separatists.”

2.4 REGIONS
The case studies are divided over four regions consisting of three countries each as explained in the previous section.

2.5 TIME
In stage 1 we will assess current concepts of security and, with some exceptions (as explained in greater detail below) will look at documents generally (although with some exceptions) published in the period 01/11/2013–31/10/2014.

2.6 SUMMARY
We have now seen how we can observe concepts of security as they are being created through evidence of securitising discourse. We have seen what the dimensions are, and how to identify them within the evidence. And we have seen how we can use salience to determine the extent to which each dimension is a defining characteristic of each concept of security. We now turn to procedures and coding instructions.
3 PROCEDURES
3 PROCEDURES

3.1 SELECTION AND LIST OF SOURCES

Our strategy for selecting sources of security reflects the vision set out in chapter 1: it conveys a range of subjective articulations of concepts of security from a variety of political actors within countries and regions. It helps us to ensure that the discourse is reflected in a reliable, representative, and valid way.

In addition, we ensured a blend of types of evidence by including at a variety of sources. The sources of security we selected together present a broadly representative picture of the political actors involved in the national security discourse in a country. Within the sources we selected we made an effort to include different political levels, by for instance looking at both national and regional government publications.

We opted to avoid the use of proxy indicators. The problem with the use of proxy measurements in cross-national studies is that a proxy is unlikely to be measuring the exact same subjective perception in different countries. For example, expenditure on home alarm systems may reflect a lack of security in one country, or a high disparity in wealth in another. At the same time we realise that, as we are dealing with perceptions of security, a direct measurement is costly to design and execute. Our sources of security therefore are not direct measurements but function on the basis of the assumption that the more people talk about an issue the more salient that issue is to them.

3.2 SOURCING AND SAMPLING

When sourcing and sampling pieces of evidence for each source of security it is essential to use data which are reliable (derived from a trustworthy source), representative (reflecting the range of different political actors constructing the discourse), and valid (an accurate reflection of their contribution to the discourse).

3.2.1 RELIABILITY

In every case we have used reputable sources as close as possible to the original political actors. For government, parliament, and the private sector we use primary sources; for academia and NGOs we use a highly comprehensive database; and for news articles we avoid the inconsistencies in different newspapers’ different search algorithms by using an incognito Google search.

We are aware of the possible limitations of Google as a commercial service with an opaque search algorithm. However the advantage of consistency outweighs the limitations. Reliability can be further increased by using Google in ‘private browsing’ or ‘incognito’ mode, and we instruct coders to do so when sourcing data.

3.3.2 REPRESENTATIVENESS

Our aim is to use the data gathered from the study to make meaningful inferences as to the different regional concepts of security in Europe. In order for us to do so we require at least 30 observations per source, as stipulated by the central limit theorem (CLT) and the law of large numbers (LLN). The CLT states that as the number of observations in your sample increases the means of the samples you draw will be approximately normally distributed. Simultaneously the law of large numbers states that as the number of observations increases, the sample mean approaches the expected value of the mean. Concretely this means that we will be able to use our sample to draw statistical inferences on the population.
Although the CLT and LLN apply from 30 observations, the accuracy of any statistical inferences increases until you reach 100 observations. To mediate between accuracy and the required coding time we will strive to include 50 observations per source of security. However, this will not always be possible. In some cases, for example the government policy documents, the total population will be smaller than 50 observations. In such cases selecting the entire population is a more efficient strategy than sampling it. In other cases, such as parliamentary debates and the media, a plethora of articles are available and in such cases we opt for a larger sample size of a 100 (since the population is larger as well).

We further aim to include observations that are representatives for the differences we expect to find within the sample. This is why we are including media sources with different political leanings. It also explains why the codebook insists on sampling both regional and national security strategy documents.

Finally it is to be noted that there exists some disparity in the time scale between the six sources. We anticipate both government and academic publishing cycles to be longer than those of the other sources, and thus extend the time span in which we look for articles in these two categories. For government publications this means we look for documents published earliest in 2010 (01/01/2010), and for academia this means we look back to documents published in the last decade (01/11/2004–31/10/2014). For all other indicators we assess evidence from sources over a period of 12 months leading up to the day the various research teams begin their research (01/11/2013–31/10/2014). If we do not make such a distinction we risk not being able to compile a representative sample for both government and academic documents.

3.3.3 VALIDITY
We ensure that statements are a true reflection of addressors’ contributions to security discourse in the following ways:

• by stressing once again the golden rule that only what is explicitly expressed within a piece of evidence should be coded. Coders’ inferences and personal knowledge must not feature in this project’s results;
• selecting sources as close to the original addressors as possible.

3.3.4 DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM SECURITY
The term security may (1) have multiple meanings in different languages or there (2) may be different terms that rely include ‘security’ whilst referring to something not pertinent to the focus of this research project.

Firstly, there is the issue of security versus safety. Languages like Serbian, German and Dutch use one word for both security and safety. In such languages the need to draw a distinction and make explicit what we are coding and what we are not coding is even more paramount. While our principal focus lies on security issues, safety issues might well become security issues if they are being securitised. For example: food safety is not a security issue in and of itself, but can be construed to become one if an actor says that problems with food safety are threatening the security of citizens. Specifically a newspaper article that details how a recent report found problems with food safety in a few restaurants is not about security, but a newspaper article detailing how food imported from country X is poisoned and is threatening the health of the nation is.

Secondly, coders should be aware of different concepts using the term security when they are designing language specific search keys. The concept of social security is for instance used to refer to pensions or unemployment benefits rather than to the actual concept of social security as understood in the context of this research project.
3.4 INTERCODER RELIABILITY

It is essential that researchers code consistently so that the same pieces of evidence could be coded multiple times by different coders and still produce the same results, or as similar as possible. We developed the research design with several tools built in for ensuring intercoder reliability, and we highly recommend that teams and coordinators make use of them. These tools include:

- Real-time access for all coders to the results of the coding. This can be used within teams and by individuals to compare how multiple team members would code the same pieces of evidence. We recommend that each team code the same several pieces of evidence and compare and discuss the results until they are satisfied that they code pieces of evidence in a similar way. This procedure should be repeated for each source. The duplicate codings can then be deleted.
- Traceability for every piece of evidence coded. Every item coded can be traced for spot checks in which coders review their peers’ work to check for systematic inconsistencies.
- Uniform coding scheme and centralised results database. These can be used by international teams to compare their coding and check for consistency. We recommend that teams review each other’s work.
4 CODING
4 CODING

In the previous sections we have elaborated on the selection of sources, sourcing and sampling and intercoder reliability. This section provides guidance to the coders regarding the coding process and includes a specific how-to description per source.

Note that the instructions provided below should be followed carefully in order to ensure the national samples can be compared with one another. In case you are unable to apply these instructions to the country under study, a meeting will take place under the aegis of Work Package 4 (WP4) Inter-case Methodology and Coherence Support between the WP leaders to guarantee cross-case coherence. Within this meeting such issues will be discussed. Do not deviate from the codebook under any circumstance.

4.1 GOVERNMENT POLICY DOCUMENTS

DESCRIPTION

We are chiefly interested in governmental policy documents regarding security and securitisation: documents issued directly by national or regional governments (ministries and governmental agencies). Generally these documents outline the strategy of the respective body of government to address perceived security issues. In addition they also broadcast this strategy (and associated security dimensions) to a wider audience.

These sources either address national security in general (a national security white paper) or one specific security issue in particular (such as cyber security) and are officially published in the nation’s first language. These documents represent the official stance of the respective government agency with regards to what security issues it sees as important and what solutions are appropriate to combat them.

DATA SOURCING AND SAMPLING

Start by identifying the regional and national governmental institutions that issue official policy documents, explicitly concerning security (preferably with a strategy component). Do so by following the steps below:

1. Google the keywords “national“ AND “security” AND “country name” in the respective country’s language. Check for the documents thus yielded whether the issuing source is an official governmental authority.
2. Screen the websites of relevant ministries or regional government authorities and determine whether they provide official governmental policy documents regarding security.

Examples on the national level are the office of the prime minister, the ministry of security and home affairs, the ministry of the interior, the ministry of defence, the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of justice, the national coordinator for security and counterterrorism and the national intelligence agencies.

3. Repeat step 1 (with “regional” replacing “national”) and 2 for the subnational level.

Screen the respective websites to find 25 documents that fulfil the following criteria:

- Published most recently available, going back at the earliest to 01-01-2010
- Mention regional or national security policies as topic

Ensure that within the 30 documents a balance exists between national and regional security strategies. Concretely this means that we do not want more than 10 documents on a national level (fewer are published on the national level) and the remaining 20
documents should be regional. When it comes to selecting the regional documents, ensure the documents are published in geographically different areas, as to come to a representative picture of the nation. If, and only if, all regional documents are exhausted can a coder return to the national documents.

Note: coders can either use the search function of the respective website and search for security, national/regional security or alternatively navigate through the website until the specific tabs (national security/security/security policy documents) are found.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS
As government publications are not known for their brevity and the resources of our coders are finite, we do not recommend coders to read the entire document letter for letter. Instead, as the documents are ‘security strategies’ it suffices to look for the main themes addressed in the strategies and read the sections pertaining to these themes.

TIME INDICATION
Care should be put in defining the list of documents to be coded. We expect a coder, working diligently for three hours, should be able to put together such a list. Once a list has been compiled, we expect a coder to code one document every 15 minutes. The total time to code this source for one nation would thus be about 9 hours.

4.2 PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS
DESCRIPTION
Looking solely at government publications would have us miss out on an important dimension of the political sphere: those elected representatives that are not in government. Discussions in parliament have a significant impact on the security discourse in a nation. Through this source of security we hope to include that impact in our overall concept of security.

We are specifically looking at transcripts of speeches by government officials before the parliament, question and answer sessions between members of parliament and ministers and other parliamentary discussions (proposals by the opposition) regarding security or securitisation.

DATA SOURCING AND SAMPLING
1. Navigate to the website of the national parliament in the country studied and start a search in the published parliamentary documents.38
2. Enter the word for ‘security’ in the language of the country studied as the single search term. Specify the following criteria:
   • Date: 1/11/2013–31/10/2014
   • Only transcripts of speeches and debates (no committee proceedings, no draft or final legislation, no reports).39
   • Only the directly elected house, the lower chamber in a bicameral system
3. Select 100 entries based on the following criteria:
   • An equal number of articles for each of the months that the chamber is in session (± 10 articles per month).40
4. Download and code all debates that match these search terms.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS
As the addressee will usually be the politician speaking, specific attention should be paid to the capacity in which the politician is speaking. Sometimes parliamentarians who are part of a party that currently is in government speak on behalf of the government (as for
instance in the United Kingdom). In this case the addressee should be the national government, in all other cases it is the parliament.

**TIME INDICATION**

Setting up the search and downloading the results should take between 1-2 hours. Debates are smaller sections of text and can be coded at a higher speed. In our pilot study our coder was able to code one every 8 minutes, and was picking up speed. In total we expect this to take about 15 hours per country.

### 4.3 ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

**DESCRIPTION**

The academic sector is an important sector in the formation of concepts of security. Through more thorough and in-depth studies they assess and contribute to the national dialogue on security. By looking at academic publications we hope to include the most important academic contributions to the discourse in our concept of security.

**DATA SOURCING AND SAMPLING**

Note: for the academic discourse we will look exclusively at academic publications in the English language. English is the lingua franca in academia these days and academia straddles national borders. Assessing only English language publications also facilitates cross comparability between the different results. We are aware that this enables contributions from ‘foreign’ scholars to also be coded, but in this particular case do not consider this an insurmountable problem. The guiding principle here is that as long as an article addresses security issues perceived to be present within a nation, that article can be part of the national security dialogue, even if the author is not from that nation.

In order to ensure the standardisation of the search results all coders use the online research tool Ebscohost. The procedure is as follows:

1. Go to Ebscohost and login using your login credentials (most academic institutions should provide access).
2. Make sure you are searching the ‘Academic Search Premier’ Database and click on ‘Advanced Search’. Once there enter the following string (modified for your country) into the search bar: (SU security) AND (SU *Portugal*) NOT (SU (“social security”)) NOT (SU (“job security”)) NOT (SU (“securities”))
3. Afterwards adjust the following search parameters. Under ‘Limit your results’ ensure that the boxes for ‘Full text’ and ‘Scholarly (Peer Reviewed) Journals’ are checked. Under Published date, ensure that you enter the year 2004–2014 as demonstrated in the screenshot below.
4. Once you are confident all search parameters are filled out properly, hit search and download all the hits you will get. You can either do this manually or you can install Zotero for Firefox to have it download all the articles for you. The screenshots below give some indication of how you can use Zotero.

First of all create a new subcollection in Zotero to store the articles in by right clicking on the library icon and clicking ‘new subcollection’.

Next, navigate back to the search result page and click the small folder icon that appears in the right corner of the address bar (the page needs to be fully loaded for it to appear, which sometimes takes a while on Ebsco). Once you click it, a dropdown menu will appear. Click ‘select all’ and then press ‘ok’ to have Zotero download all the pdf articles (and metadata) from the search result page. This process can take a while, depending on your processor,
but should not take longer than 2 minutes. In the bottom right you will see a small window indicating to what folder Zotero is saving the articles.

This search string will generate different number of hits per country. In case there are more than 25 hits, select the top 25 hits (rank-ordered by the number of citations). If there are fewer than 25 hits, code all hits.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS
For general coding instructions, please read chapter 2.

TIME INDICATION
As the search string is prefabricated, and the selection of articles should not be too difficult, we expect the coder to have all articles downloaded in about an hour. Academic articles are somewhat dense and lengthy in general and we thus expect a coder to code one every 15 minutes. This means that the total time for this indicator per country should be about 7 hours.

4.4 NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
DESCRIPTION
This source of security aims to draw up a representative sample of the media discourse surrounding security in a given country. In order to do so it codes 100 newspaper articles from both the highest grossing ‘high-quality’ broadsheet newspaper and another 100 from the most popular tabloid in the country. Find below instructions on how to select these newspapers.

DATA SOURCING AND SAMPLING
We are looking at the security discourse led by the key newspapers within one year. After identifying these key players we employ a Google search\textsuperscript{41} to draw up a sample of the most relevant articles within the last year and then select the 100 most important per newspaper. Proceed as follows:

1. Find the highest grossing tabloid newspaper within the nation
2. Find the highest grossing broadsheet newspaper within the nation whilst ensuring that this newspaper has a different political affiliation from the tabloid newspaper (=if the tabloid is leaning left, the broadsheet should lean right.)

3. If, and only if, the second newspaper has the same political bearing as the first, the next highest grossing broadsheet will be selected until one with a different political affiliation is found. If none can be found, pick the highest grossing ‘neutral’ broadsheet. If such a paper does not exist, pick the highest grossing broadsheet, no matter the political affiliation.

4. Set your web browser to ‘private browsing’ or ‘incognito’ mode. Enter the following search term into Google, translating or adapting terms in square brackets as necessary: [security] site:http://[newspaperwebsite]

5. Click on Search Tools and set the time period to **01/11/2013–31/10/2014**

6. Select the first 100 articles per newspaper that pertain to securitisation or security or securitisation. If the first 100 results contain articles that do not pertain to securitisation or security then continue with the next results (101-etc.) until a total of 100 articles are coded.

**CODING INSTRUCTIONS**
In most cases the journalist is **not** an addressee. Therefore the main thing to look for is the political actors featured in the article. Be sure to only code claims that relate directly to the country studied.

**TIME INDICATION**
The selection of newspapers and downloading articles should not be exceedingly difficult. We expect this task to be done in an hour. In our pilot study, a coder was able to code an article about once every 5 minutes. In previous studies, this speed later increased to about once every 4 minutes. In total we thus expect this source to take about 15 hours per country.

**4.5 THE CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE**
**DESCRIPTION**
Because of their embeddedness in society, and as producers as well as consumers of all forms of security, the business view adds a critical perspective to understanding concepts of security. Companies encounter various security challenges to the full array of core values.

**DATA SOURCING AND SAMPLING**
The source to be used for this part of the research is the flagship magazine published by the largest employer’s association or union in the country.

1. Select the largest employer’s association in the country and its flagship magazine. This magazine should be issued at least once a month, making for a total of twelve copies. More frequent distribution only helps to refine the search. If there is no such magazine, then pick a flagship magazine from another broadly representative employer’s association.

2. If there is a digital archive, search separately for the term ‘security’. The search period should be **01/11/2013–31/10/2014**. If the search yields more than 100 articles, then choose only the 100 articles that were published most recently.

3. Parse each of the articles found for the various dimensions that were elaborated above.
CODING INSTRUCTIONS
Care should be taken as to who the addressor is. This could be a representative from the association as such, or from an individual company or interest group.

TIME INDICATION
The selection of the magazines and the articles will take about three hours. The articles themselves can be coded at 6 minutes per article. In total we thus expect this source to take about 13 hours per country.

4.6 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
DESCRIPTION
Due to their unique position in society and their influence on the public debate NGOs can have a significant impact on societal security discourses in a country, even (or especially) while advocating those issues not currently addressed by other political actors or while pushing for more change on stagnant ones.

DATA SOURCING AND SAMPLING
Coders compile a list of the 50 NGOs with the largest budget. Afterwards this list is refined based on the number of google hits of the name of the NGO in the native language. The list is reordered on the basis of google hits and the top 25 are selected. Of these 25 NGOs the most recent annual report is coded. Proceed as follows:

1. Create a list of the 50 largest NGOs in the country. Base this list on the budget information for the respective country provided by http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir
2. Record the number of hits on Google for each NGO by:
   • Setting your browser to incognito mode
   • Changing the search language to the national language. Click Settings (on the bottom-right of the google starting page) and navigate to the Languages tab. Change the ‘Currently showing search results in’ parameter to the national language.
   • Entering the name of the NGO between quotation marks (“”) in the search bar and write down the number of hits
   • Repeating for every NGO on the list
3. Rank order the list of NGO’s on the basis of the hits on Google and select the top 25
4. Search for their last annual report or their most recent report on a relevant topic regarding security or securitisation published in the period 01/11/2013–31/10/2014. Code it.
5. If not all of these 25 NGOs publish relevant reports, complement with NGOs of the list of 50 that do address security.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS
In this case the NGOs are usually the addressors. In exceptional cases it is also conceivable to have multiple addressors. Addressees could be virtually every other party.

TIME INDICATION
Compiling the list should take no longer than two hours. Finding and coding 25 reports should take about 10 minutes per report. In total we thus expect this source to take about 6 hours of coding.
5 PROCESSING
5 PROCESSING

Once the data has been collected, some effort will be required to transform the data into national and, later, regional security concepts. This section will detail the work that still has to be done on the data but we add that these weighting schemes may need to be changed according to new insights that emerge during the research process.

Before we proceed to construct national security concepts, we will first have to decide how to weigh the different coding categories of the core values. We have written down some initial suggestions below, but are open to suggestions to change the weight of the categories after discussions between the various team leaders based on their experience after doing the research.

5.2 NORMALISING AND COMBINING DATA

Having established the weight of the coding categories within the core dimensions of security we will now have to come up with a way of combining the different core values into a national concept of security. There are two principal hurdles to be tackled: (1) we expect the number of observations across the different sources of security to vary considerably and (2) we find it reasonable to assume that not all sources of security have similar impacts on national or societal security discourses. The latter is the more challenging hurdle.

As we have previously argued, all of our sources of security are an integral part of the national security discourse, but some will have a greater influence in shaping that discourse than others. In addition, we also expect some of our sources to have an indirect impact on the national security discourse. For instance, we expect the discussions taking place in academia to feed into discussions in government and in parliament and vice versa. Because of this complex web of interactions, it is difficult to conclusively attach a weighting to the different sources. However, as all sources are important in their own right, we propose to simply weigh them equally. The interactions between the different sources are too complex for us to capture in simple form. Any decision will also be dependent on the content and focus of the final deliverables. Further methodological discussion will therefore be necessary throughout the course of the research project.

Should we decide to weigh all sources of security equally we can overcome the hurdle of having a different number of observations per source quite easily. We would simply divide the final score per source of security by the total number of observations for that source before adding all sources of security together to arrive at a national concept of security.

5.3 CONSTRUCTING REGIONAL CONCEPTS OF SECURITY

In the proposed form, national concepts of security can quite easily be combined to form regional concepts of security. One would simply have to add the different national concepts of security together. This, however, presumes that the three different countries of the regional group are of equal importance in defining the regional concept of security, which might or might not be the case. We would thus like to ask the partner institutions to revisit their regions and assess whether indeed the notion of a regional profile makes sense and then, whether or not the different countries making up that region are of equal importance in defining the regional concepts of security. If the answer either question is yes, we will weigh each of the national security concepts equally.
6 CASE STUDY DELIVERABLES
6 CASE STUDY DELIVERABLES

6.1 INPUT FOR STAGE TWO

The purpose of stage one of this project is to generate a quantitative assessment of concepts of security, which core dimensions are considered to be most salient per country from the perspective of different constituencies. Thus, stage one should yield findings on threat, hazard and risk perceptions, key actors involved, as well as ethical considerations that are at stake. At the same time, stage one should also provide more insight into national versus regional differences in concepts of security, as well as how national concepts aggregate at the level of European regions.

When the results of the assessments from each of the sources are combined in stage 1, a picture will emerge of the relative salience of each core value. Likely, it will also reflect the extent to which within each country and region, the core value is seen as suffering from particular security challenges, which actors are involved and at what levels actions are or should be undertaken. Research in stage two will then need to build on these results. Based on in-depth desk research and workshops, stage two serves as a further qualitative in-depth analysis of the data furnished through stage one.

In terms of perceptions, it is important to get a finer perspective on who are affected by what problem, and to what extent. This is more granularly established through case studies than by quantitative means. The key endeavour here through desk research, interviews and workshops is to get a better grip on a number of key findings flagged in stage one. The research in stage two might ultimately serve as inspiration for European policy makers to draw from. As such it can serve to inspire solutions, but it will refrain from making any solution specific recommendations.

Overall, the aim of the EvoCS project (and the purpose of the combination of stage one and two) is to arrive at a 360 degree substantive view of concepts of security across the Union. Ultimately, this should make it possible to assess whether EU planning and research priorities in the security domain are reflective of the regional security concepts or whether some of these concepts are underrepresented or omitted in its entirety. It is therefore quintessential that the EvoCS project elicits and present different regional concepts of security in such a fashion that its findings can directly feed into the EC security policy planning and security R&D planning (incl. Strategic Advisory Group).

6.2 OBJECTIVES AND FORMAT OF THE CASE STUDIES

The case studies thus provide an opportunity to corroborate and substantiate the data found in stage one of the research. They should:

- offer insight into salience of different dimensions, with core values as key dimension, as well as the key political actors and political levels at which solutions could be found both for national concepts of security and regional concepts of security;
- provide some contextual understanding as to the historical trajectory: how did this situation come about? While the objective here is not to retrace the origins of every perception of each core value, it would be instructive to provide general insight into one or more significant alterations in current concepts of security. As a general cut-off point in time, we suggest to go back in time no further than a decade. Overall this is a qualitative reflection that runs no longer than 3–4 pages and provides a basic primer on the evolution of security concepts in that particular country.
- establish a clear and logical relationship with the overall objectives and purpose of the EvoCS project by flagging different and perhaps under-appreciated security concepts.
across regions, while framing pathways towards thinking about priorities for security policies and research, taking into account interaction between political actors and levels.

The result of this exercise should be that differences and commonalities between concepts of security within and between countries and regions are sufficiently examined and highlighted, providing policymakers with insight into what drives thinking about security in different countries and different parts of the EU. For instance, if the research in stage one concludes that in Poland, the core value of socioeconomic security predominates, we would like to know (1) whether this view is indeed shared by local stakeholders and (2) to understand the motivations behind this finding. Then, these results can be compared against findings in, say, Latvia. To what extent do Poland and Latvia share similar concepts of security? Where do they diverge, and why so? If the core value economic security is an important aspect in both countries, is this the case for similar reasons? And how do perceptions on one set of core values impact perceptions of others? For instance, to what extent are concerns about economic security correlated with social stability concerns? And is there a disconnection between different societal constituencies? These findings in turn can be compared to findings of other case studies, thus providing for a kaleidoscopic overview of different security concerns around the Union. With that in mind we suggest the following template for the case studies:

• Description of Country and Regional Selection of Countries
• Country Analyses (by individual country)
  • Predominant ‘concepts of security’ (one or two)
    • Offer characterisation of concept (‘name’)
  • Description of security challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics & human rights in relation to the two predominating core values within the regional and national concepts of security
  • Historical trajectory (context analysis)
  • Overview of current trends with a view to the relation with the European level
• Regional Analysis
  • Predominant regional concepts of security (one or two)
    • Offer characterisation (‘name’)
  • Description of roles of security challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics & human rights in relation to the two predominating core values within the regional and national concepts of security
    • Historical trajectory: explanation
    • Overview of current trends with a view to the relation with the European level
• Findings and Conclusions:
  • Recap Country Profiles
  • Recap Regional Profile and key highlights
  • Frame pathways towards thinking about the foundations for of security research and policies.
IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS

The EvoCS project was designed to facilitate the development of EU security policies that meet security concerns across all Member States. To accomplish this it strives to arrive at a better understanding of different European concepts of security, the salience of their constituent dimensions, as well how these concepts vary through time and across different regions. This codebook presents a core element of this process: it offers a comprehensive framework that inspires and informs the in-depth case studies that will be conducted in this research project. Through the methodology proposed in this document, the EvoCS Consortium will produce a comprehensive and representative view of different security concerns in Europe. Leveraging these findings can enable the European Commission to tailor its policy to regional specificities. This in turn can increase the effectiveness, the efficiency, and the legitimacy of the European security policies.
ENDNOTES


3 These are the ‘perceptions of security’ mentioned in the Documentation of Work (DoW). The Codebook splits the perceptions of security in the actor who perceives and the level at which they perceive. To make this distinction clear, we added this dimension.

4 This dimension was added to aid the overall comprehensiveness of the framework.

5 Ditto.

6 In the DoW ‘areas of security’ and ‘time’ are mentioned as specific dimensions. This would be accurate if we are looking only at a European perception of security at one moment in time, but since we are trying to elicit different regional concepts of security which can evolve over time, neither ‘area of security’ nor ‘time’ are dimensions of a concept of security. Rather there are different concepts of security which exhibit cross-regional (as well as intra-regional) and temporal variation. We changed the language to reflect this distinction.


8 We considered a reviewer’s comment about using prominence instead of importance. We decided against this. We are certainly interested in the relative importance of a core value which can indeed also be called prominence. Yet the term prominence – like relative importance – does not cover the extent to which something is considered problematic.

9 ibid. fn.7.


12 In the academic literature, this is called the distance between a player’s ideal point and the status quo (of society as a whole).


14 ibid. 7

15 This codebook bases its understanding of core values on a host of previous research. We looked at other European research projects, notably the European Trends and Threats in Society (ETTIS) project which analysed security discourses in academic sources and official security policy documents of European countries. D1.1 Conceptual Foundations of Security” (ETTIS - European Security Trends and Threats in Society), European Security Trends and Threats in Society, accessed October 27, 2014, http://ettis-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/D1_12.pdf. Consortium Members also examined various official security policy documents of their respective countries. These included – but were not limited to – France, Great Britain, Poland and the Netherlands.

16 It is of course possible to think of other core values that could be included here. As a general principle, we did not include additional core values since having fewer rather than more categories adds to the parsimony of the measurement. For instance, in our initial test runs we found that energy and resource security correlated close to .9 with economic security, in that concerns about energy and resource security were almost always framed as a threat to the economic security and prosperity of a country. We thus opted to merge energy / resource security with economic security and prosperity.

17 Cyber security can potentially be included under a wider variety of categories, but a securitised version of cyber security will most often be related to territorial integrity and security.


19 We are interested in national and regional perceptions of security. Therefore we excluded IGOs from this list. IGOs can still contribute to a regional or national perception of security, but only indirectly through one of the sources on this list.


22 For a comprehensive overview of the relation among human rights, Consortium Researchers are referred to Document I (Concept paper on human rights, ethics and security) and Document II (Analytical framework regarding human Rights, ethics and security) both presented during the EvoCS workshop in Pisa. For outside Consortium Members, these documents are available on request.

23 See Document I, § 3.3.


The Data Repository is a Google Folder which includes the Code Book, the Coding Form and the Responses. Each Case Study Leader will get their access details which it can then share with the partners participating in the research.

Political claims are claims made by political actors, as defined earlier in this document.


See paragraph 2 of Document I, SSSUP Concept paper on human rights, ethics and security, distributed to Consortium Members, also available on request.

The related salient issues have been inserted in order to support researchers in their ‘categorization’ work. For instance, documents may not make explicit reference to the core value ‘cultural identity and security’ but may instead feature claims referring to minorities, ethnic communities, racism, etc.

This will still need to be further discussed and decided upon in the course of the project. It has yet to be determined if the structure of this dimension allows for automatic coding, whether researchers have access to it, and what program will be used. Examples of text mining programs are Leximancer and Papermachines.


See for example: the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

An exception can be made if the majority of security debates take place in committee. Do however make sure that all security debates of the main chamber are exhausted before one starts coding committee debates.

This is easiest to do when all pages have been downloaded. If this is not possible, we advise to simply set the search criteria for one month at a time and selecting 10 debates per month.

We opted against using Google News and instead will use Google Search to search the website of two specific newspapers. This is done consciously as we want to ensure that the news sources we sample are representative, i.e. they represent different political bearings and a different standard of quality. This degree of control is not possible with Google News.

This is in reference to combining the data of the individual countries into one region, the weighting and the conceptual considerations informing such calculations, are notably more complex.