D7.1 – Report on NW Europe regional workshop

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Dissemination level: PU

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<thead>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>Joachim Burbiel</td>
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Executive Summary

This report constitutes Deliverable 7.1 of the FP7 Security Programme project ‘Evolving Concepts of Security’ (EvoCS, Grant Agreement). This report on Work Package 7 (WP7) of the EvoCS project is chronologically the first deliverable of the work package. The purpose of this deliverable is to report on the North-West Europe (NWE) Case Study Workshop, which took place on the 29th of January 2015 at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London.

The insights emerging from this regional workshop have provided a sense of the complex interconnectivity of the debates that have shaped / are shaping the security discourse, as well as the disconnected dimensions that could be considered under this nebulous and politically charged term. The workshop allowed for corroboration and/or re-calibration of the EvoCS coding analysis (see Deliverable 3.1), informing the coding with expert opinion from a cross-section of policy makers, academics and practitioners. This approach aimed to overcome the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, revealing something of the provenance of the concept of security and its constituent components from a variety of stakeholder perspectives.
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## List of Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation / acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICF</td>
<td>Informed Consent Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWE</td>
<td>North-West Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Work package</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The security policies of the European Union need to be effective (in protecting our societies), efficient (in the way these policies are executed), representative (for the security interests of different societies in the Union), in compliance with the EU legal and fundamental rights framework, and perceived as legitimate (by its citizens). The EVOCS project aims to provide a kaleidoscopic, but at the same time representative, overview of the key elements of security perceptions. This will feed into the policymaking process by establishing the representativeness and legitimacy of European security policies and their ability to account for the geo-political contexts and stakeholder perspectives across which they must navigate.

The workshop was related to WP7, the North West Europe region case study (with the core countries UK, the Netherlands and France), of the EvoCS project. This component of the project involved a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and datasets that have been combined to identify the dimensions of security over time for this region. A comprehensive coding of approximately 1,300 relevant documents was also conducted using an analytical framework that is explained in Deliverable 3.1, which has included Government publications, Parliamentary publications, Corporate publications, Newspapers, Academic papers and NGO reports.

The insights emerging through the regional workshop provided a sense of the complex interconnectivity of the debates that have shaped / are shaping the security discourse, as well as the disconnected dimensions that could be considered under this nebulous and politically charged term.

The issues, influences and trends are all interconnected and systemically intertwined and it is impossible consider any political, economic, social or technical influence in isolation from the others. However, for the purposes of analysis it is useful to consider each dimension as a discrete influence in order that we can explore how they come together to influence the security discourse.

These analyses have provided insights into: the core values which are at stake (physical security, territorial security, economic security etc.) the perspectives of different stakeholder groups (including government, parliament, media, NGOs, and the private sector); the principal actors who are responsible for protecting these values; the key levels at which action needs to be undertaken to protect these values; and the ethical and human rights issues that are raised.

The aims of the regional workshops were to corroborate and/or recalibrate this analysis, informing the coding with expert opinion from a cross-section of policy makers, academics and practitioners. This approach aimed to overcome the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, revealing something of the provenance of the concept of security and its constituent components from a variety of stakeholder perspectives.

Perceptions of security are continually evolving, being shaped and re-shaped both by policy influences and in relation to unfolding events. In the process we distinguish not only key drivers of security perceptions but we also identify dominant patterns which emerge as salient in different regions.
2 Overview of the workshop format

The WP7 workshop took place on Thursday 29th January 2015 at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. Twenty four distinguished security experts and senior policymakers from the North-West Europe region attended the workshop (see Appendix A for more details).

**Informed Consent of workshop participants**

The North-West Europe Case Study workshop was carried out in line with the measures and best practices adopted by the consortium in order to enforce research activity compliance with ethical and fundamental rights standards and as outlined in Deliverable 3.2. All the workshop participants read and signed the Information Sheet and Consent Form (ICF) and agreed that some photographs would be taken used for publicity purposes taken during the workshop. The ICF was sent to the participants before the workshop via email and was distributed in hard copy during the workshop itself (all the participants read and signed the IFC before participating in the workshop) and no ethical concerns were identified or raised during the workshop.

The workshop was interactive in nature and included three discussions (as indicated in Table 1), the outcomes of which will be discussed in the Section 3 of this Deliverable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.30 – 11.00</td>
<td>Registration and tea &amp; coffee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 – 11.10</td>
<td>Welcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.10 – 11.30</td>
<td>Intro to EvoCS by Lee Bosher and Joachim Burbiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.30 – 12.45</td>
<td>Timeline exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.45 – 13.30</td>
<td>Lunch and networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.30 – 14.45</td>
<td>Discussion: What is security for you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.45 – 14.55</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.55 – 16.15</td>
<td>Discussion: Results of the EvoCS regional coding exercise by Tim Sweijs and Joshua Polchar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.15 – 16.30</td>
<td>Wrap up by Tim Sweijs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to encourage the discussion focused on regional rather than national/local issues, the participants were pre-assigned to a particular table; the tables had been organised in a manner that would ensure the representation of different countries and types of expertise (Figure 1).
The aim of Discussion One - Timeline exercise - was to find out the main influencers of security (e.g. events, actions, policies). The participants on each table were encouraged to write down the main influences and arrange these on the timeline that was provided for each table (Figure 2a). All of the inputs into the five table based timeline exercises were then consolidated into a large timeline that was posted onto the wall of the workshop room (Figure 2b).
The aim of Discussion Two - What is Security for you? - was to answer the following questions:

- What are the various dimensions\(^1\) of security?
- Which of these dimensions are more salient from your perspective, and which do you engage with?
- What similarities and differences exist across our various geographical, social, political and economic contexts?

The participants were asked to map out the dimensions of security relevant to their professional expertise and then identify the most prominent areas as well as the ‘blind spots’ not covered by their expertise or stakeholder perspective (Figure 3).

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\(^1\) In order to ensure the understanding, we did not use the EvoCS terminology. Thus, by dimensions we mean ‘core values’.
Discussion Three comprised of the presentation of the preliminary North-West Europe region coding results (Appendix B) and a question and answer session; the participants were encouraged to comment on the presented snapshots of the coding results and also provide suggestions about what the future of security might look like (over the next 5 years).

In order to disseminate some of the results of the workshop, a Twitter hashtag (#EVOCSNW) was created; overall 21 tweets were published during the workshop (the majority of which have been re-tweeted by the @EvoCS-Project Twitter account that is managed as part of WP2).
3 Regional workshop results

3.1 Timeline Exercise and Discussion

In total, the 25 delegates posted 255 ‘influences’ on the timeline, covering 116 separate ‘influences’, each of which was deemed to have determined or shaped the security discourse since the 1990s, but with a particular focus upon ‘influences’ occurring during the last 10 years (Appendix C). In addition they identified 26 trends/security developments seen as underpinning thinking in the policy arena (Appendix D).

The key ‘influences’ considered to have shaped security perceptions were seen as significant defining moments in the ways that security has been understood and accounted for in political decision making (see Figure 4 for a section of the overall timeline)\(^2\). These included influences such as the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Kosovo War, various major terrorist attacks including 9/11, Madrid, London, and the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.

![Figure 4: Overview of consolidated timeline of influences on security (years 2011-2014)](http://www.dipity.com/evocsnw/EVOCSNW/)

The key trends noted on the timeline referred to underlying socio-political trajectories and movements, which could be seen to have ongoing influences on the nature of securitization. These included the rise of organised crime, the expansion of the European Union, ethnic diversification, and the influence of social media and the internet.

\(^2\) To see the full web-based timeline, please follow this link: [http://www.dipity.com/evocsnw/EVOCSNW/](http://www.dipity.com/evocsnw/EVOCSNW/)
The discussion of the influences and trends led to the following emergent findings:

- **Slow burning unfolding influences** (i.e. trends and developments) can be as significant as high profile events, in shaping the general security dialogue. Events only pull out issues, but slow burning influences tend to be much broader and based upon “day to day” experiences.

- **Globalisation of security**: Events that occur outside of Europe can have direct impacts upon the security situation in Europe. Globalisation has a direct impact on security thinking.

- **The phenomena of ‘widening security’**: Non-security events have become securitised, because in doing so it can make it possible to quickly mobilise resources. For instance in securitising ‘immigration’ it could make it more ‘justifiable’ for policy makers to mobile resources to deal with the threat of immigration (irrespective of whether immigration actually poses a security threat or not).

- **Security considered as a negative construct**: It is extremely difficult to identify ideas about security that relate to positive events than negative events. Negative events are punctuated with collaborative policy endeavours and cooperative policy shifts.

- **Security is a ‘reactive’ process** (events disrupting trends): Security appears to be about knee-jerk reactions, but ideally should be about being able to accommodate events within consistent policy frameworks.

- **‘Hard security’** was deemed to be the most prominent dimension of security and thus can be prioritised over other dimensions. There is a distinction to be made between more general events that don’t affect the wider population directly (e.g. murder of Theo Van Gogh) but that trigger a determined political discourse and events that directly influence citizens (e.g. impacts of natural hazards).

### 3.2 Discussion on the dimensions of security

The results of this discussion demonstrated the **increasing complexity of inter-sectoral issues**. Table 2 demonstrates that the most prominent influences pointed out in Discussion One and their impacts and consequences fall across more than one category. With a large number of actors involved in affected by the security issues, it is becoming more and more difficult to clearly identify security dimensions. The political, governance, economic, physical, social, environmental and other dimensions of security are interconnected and form a complex system of inter- and intra-dependent networks that mutually support each other.
Table 2: Inter-categorisation of the most prominent influences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Physical safety</th>
<th>Territorial integrity</th>
<th>Political stability</th>
<th>Economic prosperity</th>
<th>Social stability</th>
<th>Cultural identity</th>
<th>Ecological and environmental</th>
<th>Cyber and information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11 Attacks in USA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7/7 bombings in London</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Economic Crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebola</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlie Hebdo</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of Soviet Union</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theo Van Gogh murder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Arab Spring</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration/refugees into Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerns about increased radicalisation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased awareness of climate change/impacts</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

In order to align the findings of the workshop with the EvoCS project methodology, the identified dimensions have been grouped into the Core Values categories (Table 3).

Table 3: Dimensions of security aligned with the EvoCS project’s core values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core values</th>
<th>Dimensions identified at the workshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical safety and security</td>
<td>Terrorism  &lt;br&gt; ‘Natural’ disasters  &lt;br&gt; Man-made disasters (malicious and non-malicious)  &lt;br&gt; Barriers and defences  &lt;br&gt; Not to die unnecessarily  &lt;br&gt; Sufficient resources for first responders  &lt;br&gt; No reason for fear/individual security (e.g. ability to go out at night)  &lt;br&gt; Protection  &lt;br&gt; Disaster risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial integrity and security</td>
<td>Warfare  &lt;br&gt; Armed conflict  &lt;br&gt; Defence (effective capable armed forces)  &lt;br&gt; Safe borders  &lt;br&gt; Military  &lt;br&gt; Interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© EvoCS Consortium
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political stability and security</td>
<td>UK national interests, Civil unrest, Government, Accountable political leaders, Democracy, Keeping systems going, Non-violence, Good relationships, Justice, Security of the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic prosperity and security</td>
<td>Prosperity, Financial security (ranking), Energy, Inequality/equality, Economic opportunities, Growth, Corruption, Equitable taxation, Socio-economic division, Business, Fraud, Resources, Corporate security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social stability and security</td>
<td>Opportunity, Public-private provision, Collective security (peer-to-peer), Crime, Shelter, Health, Perception of how secure we are, Law and order, Drugs, Child exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural identity and security</td>
<td>Values, Public perceptions of cultures, Expectations, Communities and individuals, Education, Civil relations between local communities, Civil relations between neighbouring countries, Individual freedom, Security of minorities within the society, Freedom from excessive surveillance, Responsibility and participation, Movements, Security from persecution, State incursion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Ecovalent and environmental security
- Sustainability
- Biology
- Clean water
- Food
- Climate change

### Cyber and information security
- Data security
- Privacy
- Cyber security (technical feasibility and functionality by providers; efficient decision making; trust in institutions providing cyber services by public)
- Security of public communication
- Information
- Cyber space

### Other
- Legal security
- Psychological security (emotional, risk/fear)
- Space security

As demonstrated in Table 3, not all of the security dimensions can be aligned with the proposed core values. In addition, it should be noted, that many of the dimensions are directly (if not always explicitly) related to human rights and ethics.

It was also pointed out that some of the dimensions - mainly those falling under Physical safety - are more often than not become the focus of what was deemed ‘hard’ security due to their proximity and high impact. Thus the most prominent security dimensions were:

- Security of the State;
- Financial security;
- Energy security.

This leads to some other dimensions of security being neglected; these dimensions include:

- Identity and culture which were not viewed as a direct threat to security;
- Climate change due to the apparently discrete long-term impacts;
- Infrastructure as being taken for granted by the general population;
- Cyber security due to the lack of understanding about technological developments.

### 3.3 Reflections upon the WP7 coding results

The presentation of the results led to the discussion that pointed out similarities and differences between WP7 findings of the document analysis and the ones generated during the workshop. Overall, participants considered both the approach and the method useful, relevant and fit for purpose especially in conjunction with the further elaboration of the findings in workshops and desk research. In particular, the importance of and the need for EvoCs project and the repeat project was acknowledged in all of the discussions, ideally with more substantial funds for the research element.
Participants appreciated the rationale of the approach and offered several suggestions for future improvements. For instance, the perception of the laymen is not taken into account; issue of framing the questions (i.e. security vs. insecurity); coding results mainly demonstrates the snapshot of security rather that its dynamics.

The discussion on the future of security did not provide predictions and forecasts (as this was viewed by the participants as rather unhelpful/superficial), but rather revolved around the fact that we need to learn from the past mistakes. The most prominent suggestions included:

- **‘Turning the telescope around’**: it is important to understand whether what/who we see as a threat also sees us as a threat;

- Security has moved into a **Post-Snowden era** thus creating new challenges: accountability, costs and so on should also be taken into account. Civil security is important, and much more intelligence sharing should be done, between agencies and also take civil society into account.

- Security is moving towards **remote warfare**, i.e. not boots on the ground, move towards using drones etc.

- It is very difficult to think what the next crisis will be, but the government discourse will identify a threat to security and spend money on preventing (or at least minimising the impacts of) these **new threats**.

- The issue of different **timescales** was highlighted particularly in relation to the roles of political decision makers. It was posited that politicians are more focused on winning the next elections that dealing with actual threats; this perspective is possibly summed up by the quote in 2007 by Jean-Claude Juncker - “We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we've done it”.

- Issues like **climate change** will become more prominent in security discourse due to its impact on inequality and its consequences.

Overall, it was summed up that thinking about possible future threats require thinking about the global context that can become a driver of the negative influences upon national and local security. Security has been re-framed from national interest to a more local human security-oriented discourse, but national, even regional interest are becoming important again: if security isn’t pulled back, it’s going to become a nebulous term that will not be clearly defined and will mean anything to anybody. At the same time, societies need to be prepared that threats exist and attacks will happen. The state cannot protect citizens of all existent threats.
4  Concluding remarks

As has been demonstrated in the North-West Europe case study workshop, perceptions of security are of course not static but dynamic. The discussions carried out as a part of this workshop aimed at demonstrating how perceptions evolve over time, sometimes along parallel trajectories, and sometimes in an intertwined manner. The workshop outcomes emphasised that whilst the most prominent areas of security are those that fall under the ‘hard security’ category, more discreet security trends are also important influences in shaping the security discourse.

The analysis of the workshop discussions pointed out the following key messages that are valuable for the development of the Stage 2 of the data analysis:

- The workshop with the security experts rendered a more in-depth understanding, especially of changes in perceptions over time. On the other hand, EvoCS coding method yields a much broader and in some ways richer appreciation of security (in all its facets). It is therefore recommended and warranted to use a combination of methods as EvoCS does.

- NWE region coding findings communicated well and resonated with the workshop discussions despite the fact that further analysis of the results is required. Participants understood intuitively how this would feed into national and regional comparisons of security perceptions.

- In working out the analysis it is recommended to identify the most salient features within the countries, which include salient differences amongst key stakeholders. These can then be used to compare national differences and build regional profiles.

- Participants first suggested and then appreciated the need to compare the project’s findings to European security policies and identify gaps and holes, in order to bridge the gap between research and policy making. This also serves the overall purpose of the project: assisting security policymakers to develop representative and legitimate security policies, which serve different stakeholders in the European Union.

- The brevity of the EvoCS results is critical. It is important to frame the key message in a way that is relevant, concise and clear. Further, more in-depth analysis of the workshop and coding results will aid in distinguishing not only most salient areas of security perception, but also the most dominant patterns which emerge as salient in different regions across Europe.
APPENDIX A: List of represented countries and professional sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Think tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Think tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Think tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Think tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Private</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Think tank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: Presentation of the NWE coding results

(click the image to download PDF of the presentation)

ASSESSING EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF SECURITY
RUSI POLICYMAKERS AND EXPERTS WORKSHOP

TIM SWEIJS AND JOSHUA POLCHAR
APPENDIX C: List of the ‘influences’ identified by the workshop participants
(Number in brackets indicate how many times the event was mentioned)

Pre-1985
Legacy of our colonial past
Thames Barrier built in 1982
Peaceful times in Europe since 1954
Number road traffic accidents getting lower
No major floods in Netherlands since 1953
Increasing number of standards on safety and security quality

Late 1980s
Reunification in 1989 (4)
Fall of the Berlin Wall/German

1990
1st Gulf War
Real Earth summit

1991
Collapse of Soviet Union (5)
Balkan War -> 1999 (2)
Defence cuts in the Netherlands
NATO announces out of area activities

1992
El Al plane flew into flat in Amsterdam (2)
PIRA condone bombings between 1992-1996
Bomb in London

1993
Serious flood threats in the Netherlands
Bomb in London

1994
Camp David accords (between Israel/Egypt)

1995
Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia (Dutch UN mission failure) (3)
Serious flood threats in the Netherlands
Brent Spar oil rig disaster
Schengen Agreement
Dayton Accords
The Internet

1996
PIRA Bomb in London
Manchester PIRA bombing

1997
Good Friday Agreement (2)

1998
Kosovo War till 1999 (4)
St Malo declaration (Franco-British agreement towards common defence policy)

1999
Introduction of the Euro (2)
Millennium Bug Y2K (2)
NATO/USA interventions in former Yugoslavia

2000
Enschede fireworks disaster (NED) (2)
UK Terrorism Act (2)
Foot & Mouth Disease in UK (2)
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIPA) Act 2000
UK floods
2001
9/11 Attacks in USA (9)
Afghanistan War (4)
Volendam New Year’s fire
EU Civil Protection Mechanism established

2002
Theo Van Gogh murder in Netherlands (5)
SARS threat (2)
Floods in Germany

2003
Iraq War (5)
Pim Fortuyn murder in Netherlands (4)
CONTEST strategy in UK
Heat Wave across Europe

2004
Madrid Bombings (5)
Creation of European Defence Agency (EDA)
South East Asian tsunami

2005
7/7 bombings in London (6)
Prevention of Terrorism Act in UK (3)
Frontex EU border agency established (2)
Hurricane Katrina in USA
Bird Flu threat
Buncefield explosion in the UK

2006
‘Inconvenient Truth’ publication

2007
Glasgow Airport attack in UK
Transatlantic bombing plot leads to screening of liquids & body scans (2)

2008
Prevent Strategy in the UK (revised) (2)
Global Economic Crisis (6)
Mumbai terrorist attacks (2)
Use of drones in overseas wars (2)
Nicky Reilly lone wolf attack in Exeter, UK (2)
Russian intervention in Georgia
Upgrade to Schengen information system
Dutch National Security Strategy

2009
France re-joins NATO
Detroit failed aviation terrorist attack
L’Aquila earthquake
Lisbon Treaty

2010
The Arab Spring (5)
Cross border police collaboration
Volcanic ash impact across northern Europe
Hungary pollution incident
The Lancaster House Treaties between UK and France
Julian Assange/Wikileaks
Ink cartridge bomb plot

2011
Syrian civil war (3)
Libyan war/crisis (2)
Anders Breivik attacks in Norway (2)
UK riots (2)
Chemical plant blaze at Moerdijk
Death of Osama Bin Laden
Deltawet in the Netherlands
Fukushima nuclear disaster
German energy transition (post-Fukushima)
2012
London Olympics security
Hurricane Sandy in USA
Ban lifted on HIV positive visitors to the USA
DigiNotar cyber attack
Operation Yewtree in the UK

2013
Edward Snowden security leaks (3)
Lee Rigby murder (2)
UK vote against bombing Syria
Brussels synagogue attack
Floods in the UK
Lampadusa boat people
Floods in Germany

2014
Ebola (6)
Ukrainian/Crimea crisis (4)
ISIL videot executions (4)
MH17 aeroplane shooting (4)
Sony cyberattacks (2)
Effective counter piracy operation in Somalia
Gaza attacks
Floods in the UK
Boko Haram school girl kidnappings
Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands
Major forest fires in Sweden
UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

2015
Attack on Charlie Hebdo (6)
Kosher supermarket attack in Paris
APPENDIX D: Security developments and trends identified by NWE workshop participants

Mentioned by eight separate participants
Immigration/refugees into Europe

Mentioned by five separate participants
Concerns about increased radicalisation (from mid 200s)
Increased awareness of climate change/impacts
Mid 2000s – social media as instrument of social mobilisation

Mentioned twice
War on Terror since 2001
Expansion of the EU
More standards for crisis prevention and response

Mentioned just once
Nuclear waste problem in Germany
More cooperation between EU nation states
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP)
Lack of climate change awareness
From 1990s, consolidation of the defence industry
1990s-2000s – general rise in crime
Ongoing border issues related to decriminalised Marijuana (Dutch)
Since 1996 Neocon partnership across the Atlantic
Rise of concept of civil security from early 2000s
Millennium Goals
From 2008 China’s territorial claims in South China Sea
Shift from prevention to resilience (from 2005)
Community tensions as a response to UK policy (2011 onwards)
Returning EU citizens from overseas conflicts
Shale gas/fracking
EU state dependency on Russian oil and gas
NATO expansion
Cyber wars