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Executive Summary

This report constitutes the final deliverable of the EvoCS project. In it, the main results of the project are summarised and put into their respective context (section 2). It also includes final notes on the inter-study coherence, comments on the methodology of the EvoCS analytical framework (section 3) and an analysis and evaluation in the context of European policy documents and the current Eurobarometer on security (section 4). At its heart, the report formulates recommendations which are based on the project's results which target different levels (e.g. the EU level, the national level) and different geographical parts of Europe (e.g. recommendations for the whole of the EU, recommendations which are specific for certain regions) (section 5). In the last two sections, a report is given on the EvoCS project's final conference which took place Brussels on 10th November 2015 (section 6) and two examples of policy briefs which are one possible product that can come out of future activities using the project's analytical framework (section 7). The annex includes a guideline in which sequence the project's deliverables should be read.

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1 Introduction

The EvoCS project started in mid-2014. The security challenges in that year are in a way both very different and very similar to what Europe is facing at the end of the project in November 2015. Russia continues to be a factor of security concern at the Eastern EU border, while the refugee crisis, which in 2014 was mostly concentrated on the Western-Mediterranean EU, has reached the countries of North-western Europe. Also, the streams of refugees have intensified in the South-East, crossing countries like Greece, Macedonia or Serbia in order to reach the North-western countries. In addition, the rapid rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has put the conflict in Syria into a new context and spurred further migration movement. All of this shows in a very pronounced way how concepts of security (or their potential materialization, relevance or appearance) can evolve very quickly in a comparably short amount of time. Whether or not the current security challenges are here to stay or are just short-term problems remains a question of debate, one that EvoCS aims to feed with sound insights.

This final report is probably the first document from the EvoCS collection of deliverables that reaches readers who are unfamiliar with the project. Thus, it gives a summary of its most important research results in section 2 without going into too much detail as to the methodology that was used. This is touched upon in section 3, which gives a short overview of the EvoCS analytical framework and discusses the main pros and cons. It also provides insights to assist the future use of the methodology. The following section 4 puts the results into a European context by analysing and comparing them to EU-level policy documents. Drawing from this analysis, section 5 formulates recommendations for policy makers and end-users from the security sector that they can use to improve their policies and work in general. In the last month of the project an EvoCS final conference took place in Brussels, which brought to together the project consortium and security stakeholders (e.g. representatives of EU institutions) from all around Europe to present and discuss the work of EvoCS. Section 6 reports on the most important discussions, feedback and findings of this conference. Finally, section 7 contains policy briefs which take the results, analysis and recommendations and compiles them into a concise format to inform the decisions of policy makers.

The annex provides a guideline for the sequence in which the EvoCS deliverables should be read from the point of view of the project consortium.

2 Case study summaries

The following case study summaries are based on the deliverables D5.2, D6.2, D7.2 and D8.2¹. The focus of the summaries is on common findings for the analysed countries and how these relate to a common evolving concept of security for each region. While the inclusion of additional countries from the same region into the study may alter the common findings, these changes will probably not lead to completely different results. It has been found that there are many similarities between some pairs of countries in the same region. Comparing this to a third country showed more differences, but also some similarities. Also, the EvoCS approach to security is a rather broad one. In many cases, it is much broader than the definition of security in e.g. national security strategies.

2.1 West-Mediterranean EU

The case countries for the region of the “West-Mediterranean EU” (WME) were Malta, Italy and Spain. Italy incorporated almost all of the key findings for the region and overlapped to a certain degree with Malta and Spain. These two latter countries represented the opposite ends of a regional spectrum.

The region is characterised by the salience of the core values “Physical safety and security” and “Economic prosperity and security”, which were among the top three of the analysed countries. However, the salience of core values in all three countries was scattered quite evenly so that below the top three core values a number of similarly important core values can be found (among them “Social stability and security” in Italy, “Information and cyber security” in Malta, and “Environmental and ecological security” in Spain). This finding points to a high degree of differentiation with a number of similar foci, due to the fact that the three analysed countries have enjoyed a period of peace of 70 or more years, which has led the societies to concentrate on more personal security concerns, which fall under the two most prominent core values. This is in line with the finding that, historically speaking, the three societies along with their evolving concepts of security seem to be converging towards a regional concept of security. This was shown strongly for Italy and Spain and more weakly for Malta.

The security challenges connected to the core values, which are common for the region, are illegal immigration, and the effects of the economic and financial crisis. These challenges are linked to each other because illegal immigrants have an additional perceived negative effect on the economy of the region. It seems, however, that security challenges linked to the economic and financial crisis are of a more temporary nature than the others (e.g. the ones linked to illegal immigration), which are seen as being long-term. Another interesting finding for the hypothesis that the long peace period has led to the present situation is that at those points where the core value of “Territorial integrity and security” were discussed, it was meant as an “invasion” of illegal immigrants and not the threat of a foreign army (this was found for the Italian case). In part, the third prominent security challenge of the region “terrorism” is also linked to illegal immigration, since the societies of the region discuss

¹ The studies can be found here: <http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables>

the effects of citizens returning from combat for the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The security challenges of natural hazards² and cyber-attacks are shared by Italy and Malta and in part by Spain (which shares environmental concerns).

What is a common finding for the region is that the national governments are the most important addressors in the security discourse (followed by the private sector) and the general public the most important object actor. Also, the most important level of discourse in the region is the national one.

The recommendations of the regional case study are based on the common findings: The most important addressors should be taken into account by EU policy makers and end-users, and the EU should strive to give more importance to the EU level of security discourse while not forgetting the presently most important national level. Additionally, the two most important security challenges, illegal immigration and terrorism, should be tackled proactively by informing the public of its backgrounds and possible solutions and debate about the possible impacts in order to prevent the spreading of extreme positions on this topic. Finally, on the one hand, the growing convergence between the national concepts of security should be taken into consideration when implementing common policies, but, on the other hand, it should be kept in mind that a “one size fits all”-solution is not feasible for most of the current threats.

² Nearly 40 years ago O’Keefe et al. (1976) stated that the term “natural disaster” was a misnomer, and questioned how “natural” so called “natural disasters” were. They highlighted that many disasters result from the combination of natural hazards and social and human vulnerability, including development activities that are ignorant of local hazardous conditions. Whilst earthquakes, droughts, floods, and storms are natural hazards, they lead to deaths and damages – i.e. disasters - that result from human acts of omission and commission rather than the act of nature (UNISDR, 2010). It is therefore more appropriate to use the term “natural hazards” when talking about the natural events mentioned above, or “disasters” when discussing a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society as a result of an exposure to a hazard.

2.2 North-western Europe

In contrast to other regions studied within the EvoCS project, especially the Eastern ones, the North-Western Europe region (NWE) features a rather homogeneous concept of security. While there are of course specific differences between the security discourses in the three countries studied (France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands), the main issues discussed and the way they are discussed show considerable commonalities (including the fact that security plays a major role in public discourse). The main values discussed are (percentage of mentions in the documents coded):

- Physical safety and security (FR: 66%, UK: 30%, NL: 29%, NWE overall: 48%)
- Social stability and security (FR: 15%, NL: 15%, UK: 7%, NWE overall: 13%)
- Information and cyber security (UK: 14%, FR: 11%, NL: 7%, NWE overall: 13%)
- Economic prosperity and security (UK: 20%, NL: 18%, FR: 3%, NWE overall: 12%)

Interestingly, environmental and ecological security is not among the four main regional core values, as it was only found to be of salience (16%) in the British security discourse. This is surprising given the Netherlands' specific geographical situation. Nevertheless, the analysis might be biased by the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of natural hazard related events during the period analysed and the possibility that some threats (like rising sea levels in the Netherlands) are already well known. On the other hand, climate change (associated to the environmental and ecological security core value) is prominently featured in the security discourse of the whole NWE region, as it is seen as a "risk multiplier" in the context of natural hazard.

In all three countries, government and parliament publications focus on the national level. In contrast to this, other coded sources focus on local and regional levels, e.g. by discussing local effects of flooding or petty crime. Both in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a formalised national risk assessment is carried out at regular intervals. The government expects other security actors to carry out their own risk assessments based on this national effort. In this context it is worth noting that governmental documents of the NWE region address the private sector more often than in the other regions studied.

Concerning security challenges, terrorism (associated to the values "physical safety and security" and "social stability and security") and cyber security (associated to the values "information and cyber security" and "economic prosperity and security") are the most salient.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the NWE region, at least not for France and the UK. In both countries, terrorism in the 20th century was closely connected to territorial and political disputes, concerning the status of Algeria and Corsica in the case of France, and the "troubles" in the context of the status of Northern Ireland for the UK. Jihadist terrorism could thus be seen as a new card in a known game. Nevertheless, 9/11 and other recent terrorist events are perceived as novel and highly threatening security challenges. Consequently, all case study countries analysed in the NWE region have developed comprehensive strategies to deal with terrorism. Interestingly, while the strategies target "international terrorism", their focus is mainly on the national actors that may be involved in terrorism activities, and the impacts this security challenge may have on a national level.

Cyber security, in particular cyber-crime, is the second big issue in security discourses in the whole NWE region, recognizing the importance of secure and reliable information networks for the

functioning and economic well-being of modern states. On the one hand, cyber-crime and cyber-espionage could cause disruption and losses to businesses and critical infrastructures, while on the other hand, a loss of trust in digital services would negatively impact the economic and social chances attributed to modern information technologies. There are variations concerning main addressors and addressees between the countries analysed, but in general, the private sector plays a distinguished role in the respective cyber security discourses.

The national government, the parliament and private sector play the most prominent roles across the region. The general public is perceived as the main object. Although variations exist between the countries analysed, the national government generally has the largest say when it comes to terrorism, while the private sector plays a distinguished role in the cyber security discourse. The National Security Strategies of these countries share similar ways of adopting an “all hazards all society” approach to security. While UK and Netherlands are particularly similar in this sense, France has its specifics. In accordance with its geographical situation, the French security discourse features much commonality with the discourse in the West-Mediterranean EU region. In France, security is traditionally seen as based on two pillars:

- Physical safety and security (including territorial integrity) which is guaranteed by the involvement in international alliances (EU and NATO);
- Social security, political stability and economic prosperity are closely linked to the functioning of the state, and especially its social and health care services.

In the United Kingdom “security” is mainly seen as a responsibility of the national government, while “resilience” is assigned as a task to local actors.

In the Netherlands, the discourse has shifted from national to international issues in recent years, especially when terrorism and cyber-security are discussed. This outward perspective is much more pronounced than in other NWE countries. Further to this, “territorial integrity” and “peace” have re-emerged as important issues.

The discussion on the effects of the economic crisis since 2008 on security is noticeable both in France and the Netherlands, while it is not part of the United Kingdom’s security discourse.

Recommendations for EU policy makers and end-users drawn from the NWE case study include:

- Given the complexity of security challenges which affects multiple actors, overstepping the national context, a multi-stakeholder and a global approach are recommended in order to address them.
- The observed tendency to widen the security discourse, implying the securitisation of non-security events (e.g. as illegal immigration), could help policy makers to mobilise more quickly the resources needed to deal with them.

2.3 Eastern EU Border

The countries analysed in the Eastern EU Border (EEB) region include Lithuania, Poland and Hungary. Overall, these countries focus on similar security threats, yet display different levels of salience of core values. Whilst Poland and Hungary display the same core values, Lithuania and Poland face similar security challenges. These congruencies are most likely the result of shared historical challenges, specifically the challenges the entire region faced after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The most salient core values in the region are “territorial integrity and security” and “political stability and security”: these core values play an important role in shaping the security discourse in all three countries. “Economic prosperity and security” is also considered an important core value, however it is more salient in Hungary and Poland, than in Lithuania. Such similarities can be influenced by a shared history of the lack of sovereignty these states experienced in the 20th century. Further, Poland singularly highlights the salience of the physical safety and security, while it ranks second in Hungary.

The most salient security challenges identified as a result of the analysis are also similar, although they are addressed by and have an impact on different core values. The Ukrainian crisis plays a prominent role in the public discourse of the EEB region. However, whilst Hungary regards it as a “political stability and security” and “economic stability and security” issue, the other two countries are more concerned with territorial integrity being compromised by the armed conflict in Ukraine. Another salient security challenge is energy supply, which directly evokes a Russian threat given Russia’s role as major supplier of oil and gas to EEB countries. In addition, the EEB region faces security challenges related to the countries’ social and economic development, including demographic trends and high unemployment. Road safety is also considered a salient challenge in terms of the physical safety and security, particularly in Poland. Asymmetric threats such as terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled migrations, climate change or destructive ideologies have not been recognized as imminent security challenges in recent history by the studied countries in the region. However, together with the traditional historically driven challenges, the EEB region is also starting to experience new challenges such as cyber security and illegal immigration. While these topics have not entered the general discourse within the timespan of the security discourse analysis, the illegal immigration became clearly securitized in autumn 2015, following the EU decision on the redistribution of refugees. It is then likely that they will emerge as concerns in the future and impact on a number of core values.

The national government is seen as both the most prominent addressor and addressee in all three countries; the role of the national parliament as an addressor and an addressee is also important. As addressors, these actors mainly focused on political stability and security and territorial integrity and security core values, whereas economic stability and security was mainly discussed by the private sector. The discussion of security challenges and core values is mainly held at the national level. However, some security challenges such as terrorism are exclusively mentioned at the international level.

Human rights and ethics issues have not played a prominent role in the security discourse of the region: Lithuania and Poland have rarely referred to human rights in the context of security whereas

Hungary's focus (when mentioned) was mainly on security challenges concerning minorities and democracy.

The recommendations of the EEB regional case study include:

- Emerging security challenges such as rapid development of threats to cyber/ information security, uncontrolled immigration, and an increase in disruptive ideologies will play larger roles in the near future and therefore have to be considered carefully by policy-makers and debated in the popular discourse;
- The issues triggered by the events in Eurozone (e.g. Greek debt, financial crisis) affect the debates in the EEB region and thus influence the shaping of the security discourse; these concerns have to be taken into account when regional development is discussed;
- European engagement in the regions legislative, economic, social and other reforms is crucial as its developmental state may have a critical effect on the security of the whole EU;

The region is likely to shift its focus from purely military developments towards a more holistic concept that stresses cooperation of various services and forces in order to strengthen non-military security.

2.4 South-Eastern Europe

The core countries analysed for the regional case study South-Eastern Europe (SEE) were Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey. Their main commonality is that they are situated in challenging international environments. Another commonality is their security perception, which has been shaped by historical experience, although the most traumatic events were quite different: the rocky transition from a socialist state to a member of the European Union for Bulgaria, the violent breakup of Yugoslavia for Serbia, and, further in the past, the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire for Turkey. Accordingly, the three core values most discussed in the SEE region are “physical safety and security” (main topic in 26% of the sources analysed), “political stability and security” (20%) and “economic prosperity” (19%). Of all security discourses analysed in the EvoCS project, the Bulgarian discourse was the only one featuring “political stability” as the most salient core value. The reason why this core value stands out is due to the often discussed challenges “corruption”, “organised crime” and the very special “relationship with the Russian Federation”. Furthermore, in Bulgaria a striking discrepancy between the security values discussed in official sources and in public media was observed. While official sources place the issue of “territorial integrity” and “physical safety and security” at the forefront of their considerations, with their main concern being the perceived negative influence of the Russian Federation on Bulgaria, the public discourse is more concerned with political stability and economic wellbeing. For Serbia, “physical safety and security” was found to be the dominant value in the national security discourse. This is not surprising as Serbia was heavily involved in the armed conflicts surrounding the breakup of Yugoslavia. The second most prominent value is “economic prosperity”, which is linked to challenges like the financial crisis in Europe and the privatisation of public property during the transition from a socialist state to a democracy (with some autocratic features in the 1990s). The frequency of armed conflicts makes “physical safety and security” and “territorial integrity and safety” the most salient values in Turkish security discourse, “Cyber and information security” was hardly ever discussed in any of the studied countries.

Due to their diverse historical and international status (Bulgaria is a member to NATO and the EU, Turkey to NATO only, and Serbia is neither, but aspires EU membership), it is of little surprise that the security discourses in these three countries were dominated by different challenges. In Bulgaria, the Ukrainian crisis, which has blurred the border between war and peace, is of serious concern as it puts into question the political stability associated with EU and NATO membership. Other prominent issues in the Bulgarian security discourse are emigration (“brain drain”) and the demographic crisis closely linked to it, which, together with economic and political deficiencies, put long-term social stability into peril. One typical Serbian security discourse item is the much disputed question whether Serbia should orient itself towards the European Union, which seems to offer prosperity and more civil freedom, or towards the Russian Federation, which is a traditional ally. Another typical Serbian challenge is the existence of large football fan groups with a high affinity for violence. Of the three countries studied, Turkey is most troubled by open violent conflicts. While the Cyprus dispute, the armed uprising of Kurdish extremists (PKK), and the war in Iraq seemed to be cooling down in the last years, war in Syria has brought fighting back to the Turkish mainland, both in the form of terrorist attacks by various combatant groups of the Syrian theatre and by warfare overspill across the south-eastern border. For several years, Turkey refused to get involved in the Syrian war militarily, yet it diplomatically campaigned for the removal of the Assad regime and was the main transit route for

fighters and goods of all conflicting parties and a destination for nearly two million refugees. In July 2015 the Turkish government decided to get actively involved in fighting and in the course of this activity broke the 2013 ceasefire with PKK. The threats to territorial integrity and physical safety associated with these developments dominate the Turkish security discourse. Beyond these specific challenges, corruption and energy security are salient issues in the whole region.

Although natural hazards do of course impact the region, they are not associated with climate change in public discourse. Climate change is thus hardly ever identified as a security issue in the SEE region.

In general, most security challenges identified in the SEE region have a history and are long-term. Nevertheless, national governments fail to address them with long-term strategies. Instead they resort to short-term tactical measures that do not tackle the causes of the problems encountered.

Concerning the structure of the security discourse in SEE, the main actor (addressor and addressee) was consistently found to be the respective national government in all three core countries, and the level most frequently discussed was “national”.

3 Notes on inter-study coherence

The basis of EvoCS is the analytical framework which was developed at the beginning of the project. It included a number of dimensions which were to be measured (or “coded”) and detailed instructions as to how the coding was supposed to take place. The analytical framework evolved a number of times during the project.

Also, future uses of the framework should include some tweaks to it which are based on discussions inside of the consortium, with the advisory board and with external feedback from the regional workshops and final conference. This section will give a short overview of what the framework entails, what the changes and problems were and what lessons-learned future studies should take into account.

The EvoCS framework is based on a number of dimensions and sub-dimensions which were analysed, using different source types:

Source types:

1. Government policy documents (e.g. national security strategies)
2. Parliamentary publications (mostly transcripts of debates)
3. Academic publications
4. Newspaper articles
5. Private sector publications
6. NGO publications

With the exception of “Academic publications”, all source types were in the native language of the analysed countries (e.g. Lithuanian and Serbian). For “Academic publications”, the only language was English.

These source types were then coded in a number of dimensions:

1. Core values:
 1. Physical safety and security
 2. Territorial integrity and security
 3. Environmental and ecological security
 4. Social stability and security
 5. Cultural identity and security
 6. Political stability and security
 7. Economic prosperity and security
 8. Information and cyber security (this core value was added during the project as the result of internal discussions)
2. Actors of the public security discourse:
 1. National government
 2. National parliament
 3. Regional state apparatus
 4. European Union
 5. International institution (for example FRONTEX)

6. Foreign government
7. Civil society
8. Private sector
9. Academia and research institutes
10. Media
11. General public or individual citizen(s)
12. Think tanks and policy institutes

Each of these actors takes a different role (or a number of roles) in the public security discourse (this was not considered a dimension of its own):

Roles of actors:

1. Addressor
2. Addressee
3. Both addressor or addressee
4. Object actor

The next dimension is about the level the public security discourse takes place on:

3. Level:
 1. Local
 2. Subnational (meaning for example the level of provinces, départements, states or Bundesländer)
 3. National
 4. International (meaning bi-lateral)
 5. Transnational (meaning multi-lateral)
 6. Global

“Ethics and Human rights” (i.e. the mention of this topic in the source types) represented the fourth dimension and so-called “Security challenges” (i.e. the actual threat or hazard to security) were the fifth and final dimension. Taken together, all five dimensions represented a country’s concept of security for a specific period in time (in the case of the EvoCS project November 2013 until October 2014). The coding process represented stage one in a two-stage process.

In the course of the project, it was observed that stage one of this framework had a number of advantages like user-friendliness, objectivity, replicability (to a certain extent) and research relevance.³ Most of these advantages pointed to the fact that it was independent from the researcher. Scientists from outside the EvoCS consortium could replicate the results by using the instructions for the analytical framework. These instructions were easy to understand and also relevant for a project that was trying to discern evolving concepts of security in Europe.

However, it was also observed that there was room for improvement. The selection of sources could be problematic for some countries, especially since it was not always clear whether a publication from an NGO or a company was actually relevant for the public security discourse. Since some source types were scarce, the time period had to be extended. Future research should take this into account and choose the time period accordingly.

³ For more details, check D4.3 at www.evocs-project.eu/deliverables

The question of objectivity of the coding process was also discussed, since there is room for interpretation which core values are touched upon in a source and whether they are only mentioned or are the main-topic (which was important for the assessment of importance of each dimension). One tool to alleviate this problem of interpretation breadth was inter-coder reliability which was a number of test-runs and discussions between coders in order to have a common understanding of the coding process. While this is one possibility to mitigate interpretation problems the fact remains that while some interpretation exists, coders normally did not arrive at diametrically different results but different nuances at most. Keeping this in mind, the construction of the analytical framework is sound.

A related problem was the question of source objectivity and the question of how to count them. For all of the country case studies, the news articles were the most used source type and the selection of news articles could have a strong influence on the robustness of the results. The project mitigated this problem by getting external expert opinions on the results and again the feedback was that the coding results mostly made sense and did not constitute artefacts.

There was some discussion on the interpretation of the word “security” in the various languages the source types were in, e.g. most languages did not make a difference between security and safety. This is a point that needs to be emphasised for each country an analysis is conducted for. Similarly, the search for the word “security” in the different source types could, depending on the local language, lead to different results. Again, it depends on each country and the language used how this problem can be tackled. It was also clear from the beginning that some core values (like “Physical safety and security”) had broader implications than for example “information and cyber security” and that this would to higher or smaller numbers in these core values. However, since this was true for all case studies, this aspect was highlighted in the analysis of these studies.

Another problem during the coding process was the question whether very long documents (such as governmental policy documents of, e.g. 100 pages) should be compared to one page newspaper articles. It is clear that a direct comparison is not possible. In the analyses, this was taken into account by looking at each the results of the source types together and individually.

The second stage of the analysis process constituted a much broader and less formalized process. In this stage, individual researchers were asked to use their expert opinion and desktop research to explain the results of the coding and to find any research artefacts, short-term and long-term security challenges. It was this stage that contributed the “evolving” aspect to the concepts of security.

Taken together, the two-stage process contributed a quantitative-objective and a qualitative-individual view on the research data, thus providing a comprehensive view on the security discourses across a variety of sources. For the sake of inter-study coherence, however, it is important, especially in stage two, to have a common vision as to what is being analysed and what form the results should take. The EvoCS regional case studies are a good example of this.

The EvoCS project designed an elaborate methodology to create an overview of what key societal actors as well as national governments consider to be the key security challenges. The findings shed light both on the prevalence of different security perceptions around Europe, and flag issues that are currently not on the Agenda.

4 Analysis and evaluation in the context of European policy documents and the current Eurobarometer on security

4.1 European policy documents

The central goal of EvoCS was to identify what citizens in various European countries and regions discuss under the label of 'security'. This perception of security as mediated through language is subject to constant revision and change. Speaking about security inevitably changes the meaning of 'security'. Bearing this feature in mind, this section will look at the use of the term 'security' in European policy documents to find out if the issues discussed under this label are congruent with the issues and values that have been identified in the country studies of EvoCS.

While there are many EU policies and documents that include a discussion of security, security itself, i.e. without any additional qualifier such as 'border' or 'economy', is quite uncommon. One of the central discussions of what security is for the EU can be found in the European Security Strategy from 2003, which outlines the EU's understanding of external security. This external dimension has since been supplemented with an internal component in the form of the Internal Security Strategy from 2010. Yet, even though they pertain directly to the mission of EvoCS, they may not be ideal starting places as they are currently in revision. Instead, the recently released Agenda on Security, published in January 2015, may be better suited to show what lies at the core of security for the EU.⁴ The Agenda, which can be considered an executive document to the 2010 Internal Security Strategy since it pertains to internal security challenges, aims to promote security among EU member states by highlighting the need to increase cross-border cooperation via enhanced information sharing. According to the Commission, this goal can be accomplished with the use of already existing communication channels as well as engaging in closer operational cooperation, which is also already supported through a variety of programs at the European level as well as European agencies. In addition, the EU can support security projects and initiatives through its training facilities and research and innovation projects. Given the important incorporation of human rights into EvoCS' overall mission, it is worth noting that ethics concerns play a major role in the Agenda. Out of five key principles that actors need to adhere to in order to strengthen programs, two of these directly pertain to human rights. The first principle emphasises that security and human rights are not diametrically opposed but are complementary policy objectives. And second, this synthesis can be accomplished if all projects are controlled democratically and transparent as well as actors accountable for their actions.

⁴ European Commission (2015) The European Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf (last accessed 9 October 2015)

In addition to discussing how projects can utilize already existing European systems to ensure security, the Agenda specifically addresses three security concerns as the most salient issues: terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters, serious and organised cross-border crime, and cybercrime. As understood by the Agenda, these concerns can be mapped onto EvoCS' eight core values (Table 1:

Table 1: Representation of the European security agenda through the EvoCS core values

Agenda concerns	EvoCS core values
Terrorism	Physical Safety and Security
	Social Stability and Security
	Economic prosperity and security
Cross-border crime	Physical Safety and Security
	Economic prosperity and Security
	Environmental and Ecological Security
Cybercrime	Information and Cyber Security
	Physical Safety and Security
	Economic prosperity and Security
	Social Stability and Security

If the Agenda on Security is considered a baseline for EU security concerns, it is noteworthy that the most important issues – ‘physical security’, ‘economic security’ and ‘social security’ as well as the inclusion of ‘environmental security’ and ‘cyber security’ – all pertain to the core values valued most by the countries in the North-West and West-Mediterranean regions of the EvoCS study. Yet, there is no discussion within the Agenda of issues that pertain to territorial integrity or political stability, which are important values in the Eastern EU border and the South-Eastern region. While it may be premature to argue that western European countries are the primary driver of deciding what concerns are security concerns, or rather what issues need to be securitised, policymakers at the EU level should be wary of this potential relationship. If this hypothesis holds true, it may have wide-reaching negative consequences for the stability of Europe and the relationship between western and eastern EU countries. Specifically, if eastern perceptions of what security needs to entail are not taken into account or not mentioned in EU discussions of future security problems, it could undermine the legitimacy of EU institutions among the people in the EU's eastern members. Policymakers should therefore take concerns about territorial integrity as well as political security seriously and use the EU's capacities to alleviate these concerns. Of course, the absence of any discussion on territorial security could be due to the EU's self-concept as a political rather than a defence union, which is the prerogative of NATO. Yet, the use of language matters, and not including any territorial concerns as part of the EU discourse may give rise to the sentiment that the EU does not pay attention to such matters.

In addition to the 'Agenda on Security', the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the later Common Security and Defence Policy, has been built upon the European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted by the EU as early as 2003. Within this framework, the EU identified five key threats to European security: Terrorism; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Regional conflicts; State failure; and organised crime. The 2008 review of the ESS largely confirmed that these threats remained a challenge for the EU; further maritime piracy and cyber threats were added to the original catalogue. While terrorism, cyber threats and organised crime are identical to the threats discussed within the Agenda and thus can be mapped onto the EvoCS core values, this task is more complicated for the remaining ones. Any success in doing so may also be quite limited in value as the ESS is already 12 years old. Currently, it is under major revision under the European Global Strategy Review process, which will eventually lead up to an EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy by June 2016. Even though this new strategy is still some time off, the Strategic Review itself is already available. Unlike the Agenda on Security, the Review only sketches a broad picture of future developments and ensuing challenges for the EU. Those include demographic developments due to migration, changes in communication due to widespread internet availability, and resource shortages because of climate change and the emergence of a global middle class with corresponding material needs. The lack of a focus on specific issues in contrast to the key threats identified in the ESS makes it difficult to map the document onto the EvoCS method. While there are occasional mentions of a specific concern, e.g. cybersecurity, natural resource management or arms control, these specifics hardly constitute a subscription to a specific Western or Eastern EU perception of threats. The complexities and challenges of the future world as portrayed in the Review are so generic that they cover all of the core values and nearly all issues that have been identified within EvoCS – excluding concerns such as road safety or football hooliganism. Going back to the hypothesis about EU security discussion being dominated by the big Western countries, the EES neither supports nor refutes it. The picture of a future world and its challenges is simply too broad.

Moving away from documents that specifically include 'security' in its title, the EU Agenda on Migration partially support the earlier hypothesis.⁵ EvoCS identified illegal migration as one of the most salient concerns of the South West Mediterranean countries. The EU Agenda addresses the questions of what the security implication of migration are for the EU and how the EU can ameliorate the situation of asylum seekers. While it is therefore not discussed under the heading of security, migration is nevertheless an important topic for the EU. And under the label of migration, security is a specific focus as well. It appears that even though migration is of utmost importance to the SWM countries, this issue is not enough to warrant the inclusion of migration into the discussion of what concerns are security concerns. In other words, while terrorism, serious cross border crime and cybercrime are constitutive of the label 'security', migration does not have enough traction to be discussed under this label. However, under the issue of migration, security concerns can be addressed. It may be useful to track the developments in the debate on asylum seekers and migration in order to ascertain if it will push migration under the label of security once it increases in salience among the North West European countries.

⁵ European Commission (2015), A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (last accessed 9 October 2015).

The existence of an EU Agenda on Migration, which is not discussed under the heading of security but nevertheless contains security considerations as an element in its discussion, highlights one of the major challenges when comparing the results of EvoCS with European policy documents. While the Agenda on Security outlines what security issues are salient within the EU, there are simply too many policy documents within the EU that contain some element of security. It is unfeasible to discuss all documents that contain any element of security. What is possible though is to check if the major concerns of the Eastern Europe Border and the South East regions are addressed within European policy documents and initiatives. Going back to the core values, it is specifically territorial integrity and political safety that often appear as important security concerns.

Both core values are addressed in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was first outlined by the European Commission in 2003⁶ and later expanded in scope in 2011⁷. This policy aims to develop closer political association and economic integration with EU bordering countries in the East and South. Specifically, the policy tries to foster and promote core European values in those countries: democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion. The adherence to rule of law and social cohesion may directly address security concerns about territorial integrity and political stability. For example, a strong adherence to the rule of law would reduce the likelihood of possible annexations of regions in the EU by those neighbours. Also, increasing social cohesion may result in less adversarial positions between people of different cultures, thereby increasing political stability within EU and neighbouring countries. These efforts directly pertain to some of the security concerns within the Eastern EU Border and the South-Eastern regions, e.g. discrimination and a decline in democracy. Unfortunately, while the goal of the ENP may directly address security concerns in the eastern EvoCS countries even though the ENP is not specifically labelled a security tool, the list of countries targeted by the ENP features one notable absence – Russia. And it is specifically Russia that has been one of the biggest sources of concern in the EvoCS study. In total, 16 countries were invited to join the ENP, including e.g. Belarus and Syria. Of course, not all 16 countries joined as partners; Belarus, Libya, and Syria have not participated in any activities, and Algeria has only just started to become engaged. Russia was also not interested in the ENP. Instead, the EU and Russia agreed to create four Common Spaces with different foci: economy; freedom, security and justice; cooperation in the field of external security; and research, education and cultural exchange.⁸ Additionally, in June 2010 the EU and Russia agreed on a Partnership for Modernisation, which was the successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Its goals are “trade facilitation through harmonisation of technical regulations and standardisation and strengthening the rule of law”.⁹ The ENP as well as the Common Spaces and Partnership agreement with Russia therefore in principle pertain to the security concerns of the two Eastern EvoCS regions.

⁶ European Commission (2003), Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework of Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf (last accessed 9 October 2015).

⁷ European Commission (2011), A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood – A review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2011) 303, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf (last accessed 9 October 2015).

⁸ European External Action Service (2005) EU-Russia: Road Map for the Common Spaces, available at: <http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/eu-russia-road-map-common-spaces> (last accessed: 9 October 2015).

⁹ http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/partnership_modernisation_facility/index_en.htm

In addition, the European Council held its first thematic debate on defence in 2013. This debate identified five new emerging security challenges: EU Cyber Defence; EU Maritime Security; Horizontal issues such as illegal migration, organised crime and terrorism; improving border controls of third parties; and energy security challenges. While these concerns overlap with those of the EU Agenda on Security and thus with security concerns of the Western Regions (North West and Mediterranean) it also includes a key concern for the Eastern countries: energy security. More traditional security concerns such as territorial integrity, which, according to EvoCS, are important elements in the security discourses of Eastern EU members, are also addressed in the Common Security and Defence Policy.¹⁰ Under this policy, the EU is actively involved in addressing security challenges among its immediate neighbours as well as further afield. Even though the policy was only established in 2003, it has led to the launch of more than 30 peace missions and operations.

Going back to the earlier hypothesis, it does not appear as if the Western, and specifically North-Western, EU countries dominate the security discourse and decide what the EU considers as challenges. However, the EU should strive to pay close attention to security discussions within its latest members and raise more awareness of its programmes to address specific Eastern concerns, e.g. energy security, territorial integrity, and political and social challenges (discrimination, democracy). Security is not only about actual projects and tools but also about perception – in this case the perception of people in the new EU countries that their concerns are taken seriously in Brussels and that the EU is willing to help them in their struggles.

Finally, while EvoCS predominantly focussed on identifying core values and specific security challenges (as summarised in Table 2), it also discussed at what level these discussions takes place. In the recommendations of its security concerns, the EU Agenda on Security also pays heed to the question at what level initiatives have to take place. It briefly summarises the role that various EU programmes and projects can play at levels that range from the European down to the local one. This targeting of local actors by the EU is surprising given that the EvoCS study found rather limited security discussions below the national level. Two hypotheses may explain this discrepancy between local awareness of security concerns and EU initiatives. First, the EU has been unsuccessful in promoting their tools at a local level. Second, local actors are aware of the tools provided by the EU but they are of no interest to them because they address concerns that are irrelevant to them.

Table 2: Dominant Core Values in regions

North-West	West-Med.	Eastern EU Border	South-East
1. Physical safety and security; 2. Information and cyber security; 3. Social stability and security	1. Physical safety and security; 2. Economic prosperity and security; 3. (Social; Cyber; Environment)	1. Territorial Integrity and Security 2. Political Stability and Security 3. Physical Safety and Security	1. Physical safety and security; 2. Political safety and security; 3. Economic prosperity and security

¹⁰ <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/>

4.2 The Eurobarometer 2015

In April 2015 the European Commission published its “Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security”¹¹. This report includes a plethora of quantitative results about the perception of security in Europe’s public. Since the publication took place in the same year the EvoCS project ended, a comparison between the Eurobarometer and the EvoCS results might be useful in understanding how different methodologies impact on data on perception. One of the key findings of the Eurobarometer is the result that “at least three-quarters of respondents in all Member States agree that their immediate neighbourhood is a secure place to live in”. However, looking at the individual states, the least agreement to this statement comes from Italy, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and Latvia (only taking into account the states that were also analysed in the EvoCS project). Countries from the North-Western region are generally above the average, while the countries from the other regions can be found both above (e.g. Spain or Malta) or below average.¹²

The ranking differs when the above mentioned statement is compared with the statement that “(OUR COUNTRY) is a secure place to live in”. Both the UK and France are now below the EU28 average, while the Netherlands are ranked in third place. Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia can still be found at the end of the ranking (meaning that only a low percentage of respondents from those countries agree with the statement). Poland is also still below the average. Notably in countries such as Italy, Bulgaria and Poland, a significant negative change has taken place since the last Eurobarometer on security was taken in 2011.¹³

The Eurobarometer also looks at factors that have an impact on a citizens’ personal sense of security. The strongest impact (in the EU28 average) is attributed to the respect for fundamental rights in freedoms. However, the difference between the member states can be significant. While Spain ranks among the countries in which this factor is considered very important, Poland and Malta are at the other end of the spectrum.¹⁴ This result is quite interesting because EvoCS noted more mentions of human rights and ethics in the South-Eastern Europe region than in any other region. However, in EvoCS this region also included two countries (Serbia and Turkey) that are not part of the EU and thus not in the Eurobarometer.

Looking at the most important challenges to the security of the EU citizens, the most prominent ones mentioned are “Terrorism”, “Economic and financial crises” and “Poverty”, followed by “Organised crime”, “Corruption” and “Religious extremism”. All of these, along with the others on the list,¹⁵ were also found in the EvoCS project. But there is also a high correlation within the results of the country-level case studies. France, the Netherlands and the UK mentioned “Terrorism” as one of the most important challenges to the security of EU citizens, which corresponds to the results of the North-Western regional case study (it was also a popular answer in countries like Italy, Poland and Bulgaria).

¹¹ EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

¹² EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, p. 6; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

¹³ EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, p. 10-11; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

¹⁴ EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, p. 16; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

¹⁵ EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, p. 20; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

In Bulgaria, in accordance with the findings from the South-Eastern regional case study, “Organised crime” is seen as a very important challenge to the internal security of the EU (thus gaining the highest rank). Interestingly, Spain has a high percentage in “Terrorism” and not in “Management of the EU’s external borders” (which could be seen as connected to the whole immigration issue identified in the Western Mediterranean EU region). The same is true for Italy. If the “Management of the EU’s external borders” is also understood in a broader sense (i.e. the protection of the borders against others, e.g. Russia), then the results of the Eurobarometer also differ from those of EvoCS. Latvia, Hungary and Poland all point to “Terrorism” being more important than the “Management of the EU’s external borders”. Similar, the UK has only a low percentage number with regard to the importance of “Natural and man-made disasters”.¹⁶

When combining these findings with the question “For each of the following, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that it could result in a threat to the internal security of the EU?”, the comparison stays mixed. For most countries, the item with the highest percentage of “agree” answers is “Extremist ideologies”. However, similar to the EvoCS results, Latvia and Poland mention “War or political instability in regions outside the EU” as the most important answer. For Hungary it is the second most important item. For the countries of the North-western region, the most important item is “Extremist ideologies” with “War or political instability in regions outside the EvoCS” as a close second.¹⁷

Another interesting finding when compared to EvoCS is the answer to the question which institutions should play a role in ensuring the security of the citizens. The majority of the average EU28 answer says “The police”, followed by the “judicial system” and “The army”. These are all national institutions, while “The EU’s institutions and agencies” is only mentioned as second last (of six). This is similar to the national level being the most important one for the popular security discourse in EvoCS.¹⁸ The take-away here is that both the Eurobarometer and EvoCS identified the national level as being more important than the EU level, at least in connection with security matters.

In conclusion, some of EvoCS’ findings are reflected in the Eurobarometer of 2015 while some are not. One has to keep in mind that the Eurobarometer is susceptible to the same day-to-day security concerns that are salient at the time of polling. In this regard, a comparison between the Eurobarometer (which was done in March 2015) and the EvoCS results (for which the coding took into account documents from 2013-2014) is not entirely possible but still useful. Especially the terrorist attack on the journal “Charlie Hebdo” in January 2015 might have had a strong impact on the Eurobarometer survey but not on the coding of the popular security discourse in EvoCS. But even taking this into account, the number of similar results is a good example of how the EvoCS methodology can give a broader picture from a different perspective on the perception of security in Europe and its evolving concepts of security.

¹⁶ EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, p. 25; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

¹⁷ EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, p. 29; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

¹⁸ EU Commission (2015), Special Eurobarometer 432 - Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security, p. 36; available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf

5 Recommendations

Based on the overall findings of EvoCS and their comparison with current discussions and activities within the EU, the following recommendations might help the EU to better integrate the security concerns of its member states under a more shared perspective. One general observation resulting from the project is the fact that even though there are many differences between Europe's nations and regions, the number of similarities is surprisingly high as well:

1) Current EU discussions on security, e.g. the Agenda on Security, appear to be synonymous with those of North-Western EU countries. This focus undermines security as it suggests to those EU citizens in other regions – especially in the East and South-East – that their concerns are not taken seriously in Brussels. To counteract this perception, the EU should strive to enlarge its discussion under the umbrella of security and include concerns that belong to the values of 'political security' as well as 'territorial security'.

2) It is laudable that the EU offers help not only at a national but also on a regional or local level. Yet, given the absence of discussions of 'security' at a local level (which might be due to the coding methodology – e.g. in the UK 'security' is discussed as 'resilience' at the local level), these offers may not be taken up either because they are not known at a sub-national level or they offer help that is not needed. To address the first problem, the EU should increase its promotion and awareness raising initiatives at a local level to improve the use of their services. If the request for EU help at a local level remains minute, the EU needs to reassess its programmes and be more active in identifying concerns at the local level. Research similar to EvoCS but specifically targeting local actors would be a useful component in identifying needs and concerns.

3) Russia is an important variable for security perceptions of many Eastern European countries and their citizens. Given their respective histories, countries hold quite diametrically opposed positions towards it. The EU needs to be very careful in commenting on Russia's actions and implementing strategies. Some Eastern countries are quite concerned about their territorial integrity, which has been further strengthened after the illegal annexation of the Crimea by Russia, and about energy security, which is highly dependent on imports from Russia. Others maintain close ties with Russia, yet are also part of Europe and are either already (Bulgaria) or potential EU members.

4) The EvoCS project was interested in assessing security perceptions of key societal actors across European societies starting from the premise that security policies need not only be effective but should also reflect and address the concerns of European societal actors and, if possible, involve them in solutions. The provision of security is still one of the quintessential tasks of states, but what is becoming increasingly clear is that states cannot – and should not – do this alone.

5) In the context of a diffuse and diverse risk universe, where it is not merely military threats but a broad range of security challenges that modern societies face, societal actors need to be involved in the provision of security, again both for reasons of effectiveness and legitimacy.

6) Societal actors are not just consumers of security but are also producers of security. If a comprehensive approach to security challenges is considered, then a true comprehensive approach

is not whole-of-government, but really whole-of-society, or involving various societies. This aspect has to be taken into account.

7) Where it comes to the formulation of security strategies and policies at a European level and the allocation of R&D funds in security agenda, it is relevant and necessary to take into account different European security concerns both at the governmental and the societal level.

8) The EvoCS project started out with the intention to compare salient security concerns across different European societies, to map them to European security strategies and the European R&D agenda and to highlight any gaps. Those societal concerns incongruent with the strategies could then be incorporated into the process of formulating strategies and R&D Agendas.

Based on the regional recommendations, the following clusters of recommendations can be created (following each cluster are the respective recommendations from the regional case studies):

1. The EU should take regional security challenges and perceptions more seriously and address them in their EU policies. This means, that the EU should take a more active role in shaping the security environment in Europe.
 - a. Most of the prominent security challenges linked to the salient core values should be addressed more from the EU level policies. (Western Mediterranean Region)
 - b. The threat perceptions (especially politico-military and economic/energy security) of central and eastern EU member states need to be properly addressed by the EU. (Eastern EU Border Region)
 - c. The EU should take a stronger role by taking more responsibility where national capabilities are underdeveloped and where NATO is limited by its purely military character (e.g. police and special forces to counter what has been coined “hybrid threats”) (Eastern EU Border Region)
 - d. The EU should work more on the reciprocal acknowledgment of the different priorities within the concept of security of EEB region Member States by countries from other regions of the Union, and vice-versa (Eastern EU Border Region)
 - e. There is a need for a new policy response that would join up agendas and issues rather than divide them into security and non-security ones (North-western Europe Region). In this context, the issue of possible over securitisation needs to be taken into account.
 - f. In contradiction to recommendation 2, it might also make sense to focus on the possibilities of strengthening the European Union level, since there are still many countries in Europe that wish to join the EU (mostly in the South-Eastern Europe Region).

2. The main level the security discourse takes place at is the national one. This has to be taken into account by policy makers and security end-users in their day-to-day work.
 - a. The national level should be the target of actions from policy-makers and stakeholders since it is the main level for the security discourse. (Western Mediterranean Region)
 - b. Since the most prominent level of discourse is the national level, any kind of European Union involvement in drafting security strategies for the region should take this level as the main point of focus and the national governments and parliaments as the main addressee (South-Eastern Europe Region)

3. The EU and security end-users should focus their efforts more towards those security stakeholders which were identified as being of high importance in the public security discourse (e.g. the national government and the private sector).
 - a. National governments and the private sector should be considered the main interlocutors for policy-makers and stakeholders, since they are the main actors in the regional security discourse. (Western Mediterranean Region)
 - b. A more joint approach should be taken by the national government and private sector when addressing the threats (in particular of cyber-crime and cyber security), as well as wider engagement with other actors – and in particular general public (North-western Europe Region)
 - c. Engagement of different stakeholders by national government is critical. (Western Mediterranean Region)
 - d. There is a need to ‘think globally but act locally’ involving local stakeholders (including general public): being the largest object of threats, general public should also become an addressee and the addressor of these threats as it will help identification of the issues salient to general public rather than focus on generic issues (North-western Europe Region)
4. A “grand European security strategy” will not work.
 - a. A “one solution fits all” approach does not work. (West-Mediterranean Region)
 - b. Instead of a one-size-fit-all strategy, a common guideline may be later nationally implemented.(South-Eastern Europe)
5. Ethics and fundamental rights need to be placed at the centre of the public security discourse.
 - a. There is a need to incorporate the human rights and ethics issues and insure that the security agenda is seen through these lenses (as well as more traditional ones) (North-Western Europe Region)
 - b. Securitisation of new and emerging threats should be treated with caution: The process of securitisation of the threats that are not security-related in a traditional sense, like illegal migration, may happen because it brings specific threats - such as climate change or immigration– to the top of the agenda, however it also takes away the core elements of these threats which have nothing to do with security (e.g. GHG emissions reduction, human rights) (North-Western Europe region)

It is interesting to note that some of these recommendations seem to contradict each other. For example recommendation 1 speaks about a more active EU, while recommendation 2 marks the national level as the most important one and recommendation 4 says that a general EU approach to security will not work.

However, looking at the recommendations more closely shows that they do not contradict each other but are instead closely linked and intertwined. The EU can take the lead (recommendation 1) in identifying the most important stakeholders of the public security discourse in Europe (recommendation 3). This can then be communicated on the national level and together with the national governments, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders (recommendation 2). Such an approach can respect each region’s and countries unique characteristics, while keeping the EU

perspective in place (recommendation 4). Recommendation 5 targets a deeper understanding of the public security discourse in which ethics and fundamental human rights should have a stronger position along with the question which security challenges should indeed be securitised and which not. This is just one possibility of how all five recommendations can be combined to a meaningful way.

Apart from these “European” recommendations, there are a number of recommendations which are characteristic of each region:

1. Breaking the myths about illegal immigration and terrorism is important. (West-Mediterranean Region)
2. The Eastern EU Border region security concept, which puts threats to the territorial integrity of the states into the core of the discourse, calls for attention at the EU level. (Eastern EU Border Region)
3. European engagement into the reforms of the EEB countries’ economies and legal systems is still necessary (Eastern EU Border Region)
4. Some of the results of the national case studies are also of relevance for security end-users like national police forces, fire fighters or crisis reaction forces. Having a better understanding of the security discourse in each of the region’s countries can help during international peace missions (e.g. in Bosnia or Kosovo) or international aid after natural disasters (South-Eastern Europe Region)
5. The degree of convergence among national historical trajectories should be taken in high consideration. (West-Mediterranean Region)

These recommendations pertain to more regional interest and can inform regional and national security stakeholders in their work.

6 Report on the EvoCS final conference

As described in T2.4 of the description of work of the project, the main findings of EvoCS were to be presented at a final conference.¹⁹ This final conference was organised by WP2 and took place at the BAO (Bouche á Oreille) Congress Centre in Brussels. The conference's programme was organised as described in the task description. Its focus was on presenting the main results of EvoCS and to give the opportunity to the audience to share its views and discuss them. In contrast to the task description, the special issue of "Information & Security: An International Journal"²⁰ was prepared before the conference, so that the printed version could be disseminated to the conference participants.

The event brought together 60 participants from EU institutions, national governments, international organisations, NGOs, academia, and the industry to share views on important topics for policy setting in Europe and to discuss perceptions of security, similarities and differences in the national approaches to security in the regions examined, and to draw actionable policy conclusions. The participants were nationals of 23 European countries (incl. 18 EU member states).

The composition of the audience of the event was as follows: 23% national authorities (Ambassadors in the Political and Security Committee of the EU, high- and mid- level representatives to the EU from national diplomatic missions, national or regional police), 18% academia, 11% EU institutions (European Parliament, DG HOME, EEAS, Europol, European Security and Defence College), 10% SME, and 1% international organisations. 36% of the audience was comprised of members of think tanks, research institutes and media. The audience thus included many policy makers, who were one of the main target groups of the EvoCS project. Security end-users were also present in the form of police officers and humanitarian aid workers.

Opening session

The conference commenced with a short speech by one of the project coordinators about the mission of EvoCS as well as the goals of the conference, which was followed by the opening session. This session, similar to the other four sessions which were about each of the four EvoCS regions, was a panel discussion including a moderator. The opening session included short speeches by Stephan Müller (Permanent Representative to the Political and Security Committee of the EU, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), Mariya Gabriel (MEP of the European People's Party and member of the LIBE Committee) and Luis Amorim (Head of Unit, Council Secretariat on Foreign Affairs, Enlargement and Civil Protection, Council of the EU). The session was moderated by Todor Tagarev (former minister of Defence of Bulgaria and member of the EvoCS consortium). The speakers noted the importance of projects like EvoCS in order to inform the work of policy makers. For example, one of the speakers stated clearly that one of her missions is to fight misuses of European instruments, which can only be done when the perception of these instruments is understood correctly. Being asked by one of the

¹⁹ "Final" is to be understood in the context of the regional workshops, which were held at the beginning of 2014. The final conference would be the last official event, at which results of EvoCS were to be discussed with a broader public within the framework of the project.

²⁰ The journal can be accessed here: <http://procon.bg/33-evolving-concepts-security>

coordinators as to why EU officials do not take the national level of the popular security discourse more strongly into account in their work another speaker answered that he cannot comment on that since he has been working on the EU level for decades and that he “lives in this bubble”. This comment was taken by the EvoCS consortium as encouragement to carry the results of their project into the EU institutions in order to build bridges into these “bubbles”.

Session on the North-Western Europe region: “Competing and Conflating Discourses in the North-Western Europe Security Agenda”

The following session focused on the North-Western Europe region and was titled “Competing and Conflating Discourses in the North-Western Europe Security Agenda”. The speakers included Cyrille Schott, (Director of the National Institute of Advanced Studies on Security and Justice, France), Jorge Manuel Bento-Silva (Counterterrorism Unit, DG HOME), Tim Sweijs (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and member of the EvoCS consortium) and Pete Fussey (Department of Sociology, University of Essex). The session was moderated by Lee Boshier (Loughborough University and member of the EvoCS consortium). One of the panellists commented on the EvoCS project by critiquing some of its methodology and recommended changes while also praising the work that has been done. Being a policy maker, the panellist commented that he was able to use parts of the preliminary results of the project at the beginning of 2014 in order to inform his work on the Internal Security Strategy (ISS). Again, this was taken by the EvoCS consortium as a sign that their efforts to help policy making in the EU with their results were successful.

Session on the West-Mediterranean EU region: “Re-Thinking Security within Porous Borders”

The third session was about the West-Mediterranean region and was titled “Re-Thinking Security within Porous Borders”. This session’s panellists were Alessandro Marrone (IAI and member of the EvoCS consortium), Han Entzinger (Migration and Integration Studies, Department of Sociology, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam), Giovanni Faleg (Consultant at the World Bank) and Martin Xuereb (Director of the Migrant Offshore Aid Station). The session was moderated by Javier Herrera (Tecnalia, and member of the EvoCS consortium). This panel was of special interest due to the growing importance of the refugee crisis, which was unfolding at the time the final conference took place. One of the panellists pointed out that the securitization of the economic crisis was a new element and that it is necessary to have a clear picture of what immigration is to avoid extremism. Another panellist emphasized that creating social bonds was needed and that reaching the “person in the street” required sophisticated communication tools. He also advised against trying to create sustainable development goals in unsustainable scenarios. A third panellist wondered why security and migration have become lately so closely linked and underlined that attacks were perpetrated mostly by members of the second generation, not migrants themselves. He reminded that migration may lead to misunderstandings but also to cultural exchanges and that Italy and Spain were countries of emigrants not so long ago. Finally, the fourth panellist defended the mission of his organization (the Migrant Offshore Aid Station) proclaiming that as a society we have the opportunity of choosing our future. One interesting question was formulated about the use of migration as a weapon and that migration has side effects in other security challenges.

Session on the South-Eastern Europe region: “Achieving Security and Stability at the EU’s Doorstep”

The next panel was on the South-Eastern Europe region and was titled “Achieving Security and Stability at the EU’s Doorstep”. The panellists were Brian Donald (Head of the Office of the Director, Europol), Dennis Blease (Senior Security & Justice Advisor, UK Stabilisation Unit), Todor Tagarev, former Minister of Defence of Bulgaria and member of the EvoCS consortium) and Antonella Valmorbida (Secretary General, ALDA – the European Association for Local Democracy). The session was moderated by Vladimir Cuc (Minister – Counsellor, The Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the EU).

Session on the Eastern EU border region: “A Hybrid Quagmire: Eastern EU Border between Nuclear Muscle-flexing and Information War”

The final session was about the Eastern EU border region and it was titled “A Hybrid Quagmire: Eastern EU Border between Nuclear Muscle-flexing and Information War”. The panel was moderated by Brooks Tigner (Chief Editor & Policy Analyst, Security Europe) and included the following speakers: Sandro Calaresu (Military Advisor, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), EEAS), Imants Lieģis (Latvian Ambassador to Hungary, former Latvian Minister of Defence), Marcin Terlikowski (PISM and member of the EvoCS consortium) and Janusz Onyszkiewicz (former Polish Minister of Defence, Chairman of the Euro-Atlantic Association of Poland). In this panel, the discussion focused on the security challenges posed by Russian policy towards Ukraine and Eastern EU border countries.

Closing keynote and end of the conference

Carola van Rijnsoever (Representative to the Political and Security Committee, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Brussels) delivered the closing keynote and the conference was closed with some remarks by one of the coordinators of the project.

During the conference, a number of participants twittered their impressions, which were retweeted and discussed in social media.

7 Policy Briefs

The idea behind the “policy briefs” is to use the results from the EvoCS project and create a two-pager for policy-makers that sums up the most important results for a country or region. This way, a policy-maker can focus on the results which are important for him or her without having to read a complete deliverable. The policy briefs constitute a “product” that comes out of the EvoCS project. It is planned to exploit these kinds of products in future projects. This section includes three examples of such two-pagers, which have been created and used during the project:

1. A policy brief for the participants of the North-West Europe regional workshop, summing up the results of this event.
2. A policy brief on the EEB region, which was published on the website of PISM.



EvoCS Workshop Brief



OVERVIEW

The purpose of this briefing is to report on the key observations from the North-West Europe Case Study Workshop, which took place on the 29th of January at the Royal United Services Institute in London. The insights emerging from this EvoCS regional workshop have provided a sense of the complex interconnectivity of the debates that have shaped/are shaping the security discourse, as well as the disconnected dimensions that could be considered under this nebulous and politically charged term. The workshop allowed for corroboration and/or re-calibration of the EvoCS coding analysis, informing the coding with expert opinion from a cross-section of policy makers, academics and practitioners. This approach aimed to overcome the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, revealing something of the provenance of the concept of security and its constituent components from a variety of stakeholder perspectives.

WORKSHOP RESULTS

Timeline Exercise and Discussion

In total, the 24 delegates posted 255 ‘influences’ on the timeline, covering 116 separate ‘influences’, each of which was deemed to have determined or shaped the region’s security discourse since the 1990s, with a particular focus upon ‘influences’ occurring during the last 10 years. In addition participants identified 26 trends/security developments viewed as underpinning thinking in the policy arena. The key ‘influences’ considered to have shaped security perceptions were seen as significant defining moments in the ways that security has been understood and accounted for in political decision making.²¹ These included influences such as the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Kosovo War, various major terrorist attacks including 9/11, Madrid, London, and the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.

The key trends noted on the timeline referred to underlying socio-political trajectories and movements which could be seen to have ongoing influences on the nature of securitization. These included the rise of organised crime, the expansion of the European Union, ethnic diversification, and the influence of social media and the internet. The discussion about the influences and trends led to the following key points:

- **Slow burning unfolding influences** (i.e. trends and developments) can be as significant as high profile events, in shaping the general security dialogue.
- **Globalisation of security:** Events that occur outside of Europe can have direct impacts upon the security situation in Europe.
- **The phenomena of ‘widening security’:** Non-security events have become securitised, because in doing so it can make it possible to quickly mobilise resources.
- **Security considered as a negative construct:** It is extremely difficult to identify ideas about security that relate to positive events than negative events. Negative events are punctuated with collaborative policy endeavours and cooperative policy shifts.
- **Security is a ‘reactive’ process** (events disrupting trends): Security appears to be about knee-jerk reactions, but ideally should be about being able to accommodate events within consistent policy frameworks.
- **‘Hard security’** was deemed to be the most prominent dimension of security and thus can end up being prioritised over other dimensions.

Discussion about the dimensions of security

²¹ To see the full web-based timeline, please follow this link: <http://www.dipity.com/evocsnw/EVOCSNW/>

The results of this discussion demonstrated the increasing complexity of inter-sectoral issues. With a large number of actors involved in security related issues, it is difficult to identify specific security dimensions. The political, governance, economic, physical, social, environmental and other dimensions of security are interconnected and form a complex system of inter- and intra - dependent networks that mutually support each other.

It was also pointed out that some of the dimensions - mainly those falling under Physical safety - more often than not become the focus of what was deemed 'hard' security due to their proximity and high impact. Thus the most prominent security dimensions were: Security of the State; Financial security; and Energy security. It was suggested that this leads to some other dimensions of security being neglected; these dimensions include: Identity and culture which were not viewed as a direct threat to security; Climate change due to the apparently discrete long-term impacts; Infrastructure as being taken for granted by the general population; and Cyber security due to the general lack of understanding about technological developments.

Reflections on the provisional EvoCS findings

The presentation of the provisional EvoCS results for NW Europe led to the discussion that highlighted similarities and differences between the findings of the document analysis and those generated during the workshop. It was acknowledged that due to the time and financial resource constraints, the project has some limitations. For instance, the perception of the laymen is not taken into account; issue of framing the questions (i.e. security vs. insecurity); coding results mainly demonstrates the snapshot of security rather than its dynamics; spatial framing of security.

The discussion on the future of security did not provide predictions and forecasts (as this was viewed by the participants as unhelpful/superficial), but rather revolved around the suggestion that we need to learn from past mistakes. The most prominent suggestions included:

- **“Turning the telescope around”**: it is important to understand whether what/who we see as a threat also sees us as a threat;
- Security has moved into a **Post-Snowden era** thus creating new challenges: accountability, costs and so on should also be taken into account. Civil security is important, and much more intelligence sharing should be done, between agencies and also take civil society into account.
- Security is moving towards **remote warfare**, i.e. not boots on the ground, move towards using drones etc.
- It is very difficult to think what the next crisis will be, but the government discourse will identify a threat to security and spend money on preventing (or at least minimising the impacts of) these **new threats**.
- The issue of different **timescales** was highlighted particularly in relation to the roles of political decision makers.
- Issues such as **climate change** will become more prominent in security discourse due to the likely impacts on global and regional inequalities and subsequent knock-on consequences.

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Navigating Through Threat Perceptions in Europe: EvoCS Contribution

Marcin Terlikowski, PISM

Over 2015 much has been said about the lack of solidarity across the European Union, mainly in the context of refugee relocation and the EU policy towards Russia. In none of these two, strategically important, issues could the EU find a common language and build a sustainable consensus. Agreed refugee relocation quotas have quickly become irrelevant, as next waves of migrants arrived in the EU, putting at both border and target states. Sanctions imposed on Russia in the aftermath of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian military engagement in the Eastern Ukraine conflict have been promptly confronted with the Member States' strong drive to return to the business as usual with Moscow. Like always, when European unity turns out to be elusive, differences in threat perceptions among EU member states, and their leaders' inability to navigate through them, were widely blamed. But how exactly Europeans differ with regards to threat perceptions? What are these differences about and how they are evolving? Can you negotiate then and find a common denominator? These questions were in the center of the EvoCS project. At its conclusion, the results of EvoCS provide some insights into the scale and character of divergences in threat perceptions of individual member states and regions of the EU.

The EvoCS project deployed a robust methodology to map security discourse in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The innovative method of analysis allowed to extract different constitutive elements of national security discourse: core values (i.e., values to be protected), specific threats to these core values, hierarchy of actors, which are seen the most capable of addressing them, and relation between securing and human rights. The results shed some light on the landscape of threat perceptions within the EU. There are three crucial takeaways from EvoCS.

First, the concept of security in the EU is clearly undergoing a **shift from a state-centric model to one focused on the citizen**. In the majority of analyzed countries and regions, the most salient core values were directly linked to safety of individuals, rather than security of the state, understood as its structures. Under the core value "physical safety and security", which topped – albeit not clearly dominated – security discourse in all regions but Eastern EU border, very divergent threats were indicated as security challenges. Among them were: corruption, natural hazards, cybercrime, road accidents, terrorism, both organized and petty crime, energy and food supply, illegal migration. While some of them indeed relate to individual security of citizens, for instance road accidents or petty crime, the other, like terrorism or disruptions in energy supplies have been traditionally seen as a threat to the state. Now they seem to be discussed mostly through the perspective of their effects on the functioning of individual citizens, not the state. This suggests, that **in the popular perception the state is seen as relatively secure and invulnerable, while it is individuals, which are perceived affected the most by security threats**. Consequently, one may argue that security concept in the EU is becoming increasingly in line with the theoretical paradigm of human security, which – broadly speaking – puts the individual (rather than the state or the international system) in the center of security (citizens become the "referent object" of security). What may further confirm this assumption, is high salience of core values – and threats – linked to economic growth and political stability. According to EvoCS results one the biggest security concern of all Europeans is economic downturn resulting in unemployment and failure of welfare state-provided social services.

Second, the results of EvoCS suggest, that **differences in security concepts between individual member states and regions of the EU are linked to the perception of the stability of the state by the society**. The best illustration of this argument comes from the comparison of the Eastern EU Border and North Western EU regions. In case of the latter, the emphasis in security discourse is put on terrorism, cybersecurity and natural hazards as the most important threats to a whole set of core values – mostly individual safety of citizens in the physical and economic sense. The Eastern European member states, concentrate their security discourse of Ukrainian crisis and provocative Russian policy towards the former communist bloc; both are seen as a threat to survival, independence and territorial integrity of the state, understood as organization. At the same time terrorism, cybercrime or natural hazards hardly feature in the regional debate. Consequently, the main difference seems to lay in the fact, that **in the border region**

of the EU, the state is seen by citizens as largely weak, prone to external coercion and consequently insecure. Meanwhile, in the West of Europe, states are perceived as relatively strong and resilient to existential threats.

This divergence can be explained not only by the obvious differences in geopolitical position, by also turbulent history of Central and Eastern Europe countries, and – even more importantly – by the still unfinished economic and political transformation. Over the 20th century these states have experiences dramatic changes of borders, suffered under communist regimes and – most recently – have been undergoing a difficult process of building market economy, democratic government and civil society. The latter process is well advanced, but not far from finished. There are many EU Member States, which laid cornerstones of liberal democracy, but the institutions, regulations and political culture are underdeveloped and prone to various abuses.

Finally, EvoCS results prove that **citizens across Europe expect the state, rather than the European Union, to address security threats.** In all analyzed regions, security discourse focused on the national government as the most proper level of action to fight threats, improve resilience or recover from damages and rarely address European Union in this regard. In other words, security is perceived across Europe through a national lens. Even if threats are properly defined as transnational (like terrorism, natural hazards, organized crime, etc.), participants of the security discourse rarely seen a role for EU, or other international organizations for that matter, in fighting them. This may come as a surprise, given that today's international security policy could not exist without organizations like United Nations, North Atlantic Alliance, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and of course also European Union. Digging deeper into the results of EvoCS one find, however, that expert-level sources (academic analyses, governmental documents) do address the EU in their discourse about security threats. This suggest that the genuine problem is not the lack of relevancy, but limited visibility of EU's efforts aimed at increasing security, for instance as regards cooperation to fight terrorism or assist in cases of natural disasters.

The above described findings of EvoCS pertain to policies of the EU. To begin with, the EU should address the increasing focus of security discourse on individual safety of citizens, and not the state. If security is mostly seen in today's Europe through the perspective of an individual person, its physical safety and economic well-being etc., the EU should rethink its policies according to that phenomenon. Already the Union is guided by the focus on increasing the integration benefits to an average citizen. Currency union, Schengen zone, competitiveness regulations, customer protection laws, etc. are designed the way, so that they bring tangible fruits for all EU citizens. Meanwhile, Euroscepticism is rising across the EU and the organization itself – which is also proved by EvoCS– is not popularly recognized as an actor, which can help deal with security threats. This situation calls for rethinking both the goals of some policies and – maybe more importantly – the way they are presented to the wider public. The latter, it seems, benefits from the European project every day, while not really acknowledging that fact.

With regards to differences in threat perceptions, the EU has no other choice, than to acknowledge them and accommodate all sensitivities and concerns of its Member States. Over years the Union has developed robust mechanisms to help fight terrorism, deal with effects of natural hazards or combat organized crime (though the visibility problem is strong, as suggested above). Now, with the rise of migration issue and the growing fear of the return of Russian imperialism among the Eastern EU Member States, the EU cannot remain silent. Concerning the latter issues, the argument that defence is the role of NATO is not valid. If Russia is to repeat a hybrid war scenario against any of the EU members, the Union will not only political weight and legal obligation (art 42.7 TEU), but also non-military tools to react and assist the victim. It requires, however, breaking the strategic taboo and admitting that the EU is able to deal with a full spectrum of security threats, as they feature in security discourse of its member states.

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9 Annexes

9.1 Guideline to reading the EvoCS deliverables

If this is the first deliverable you have read on the results of the EvoCS project then it might be of interest to you to read through other deliverables. This annex represents a guideline for reading the deliverables in the sequence in which they were logically written.²² If you are interested in the analysis of specific countries or regions, you can skip the methodological deliverables and read the analytical deliverables directly.

1. D3.1 “Assessing Evolving Concepts of Security” (**methodological**): This deliverable represents the first version of the analytical framework which was used to define an evolving concept of security with its dimensions. It also includes detailed instructions on how the source items for the analysis are supposed to be coded. This deliverable is a manual for researchers interested in reproducing the results of EvoCS or to use the EvoCS methodology in their own research. Keep in mind that the following D4.1, D4.3 and D9.1 include iterations of and comments on parts of D3.1.
2. D5.1 “Workshop Report West-Mediterranean Europe” (**analytical**): This deliverable, along with D6.1, D7.1 and D8.1, is a report on a workshop which was held in L’Aquila/Italy at which the analytical framework and the first coding results were presented to regional experts. The findings were discussed and feedback collected in order to improve upon the way the analysis was conducted.
3. D6.1 “Workshop Report Eastern EU Border” (**analytical**): Similar to D5.1. The workshop for this deliverable was held in Warsaw/Poland.
4. D7.1 “Workshop Report North Western Europe” (**analytical**): Similar to D5.1. The workshop for this deliverable was held in London/UK.
5. D8.1 “Workshop Report South Eastern Europe” (**analytical**): Similar to D5.1. The workshop for this deliverable was held in London/UK.
6. D4.1 “Tools for methodological support” (**methodological**): After the publication of D3.1, the EvoCS consortium started working with it and using the analytical framework in a number of test runs. The feedback from those test-runs and the regional workshops was collected in D4.1 in order to improve upon the existing analytical framework and expand it in parts.
7. D5.2 “Case Study on West Mediterranean EU” (**analytical**): With the refined version of the analytical framework finished, the partners of the EvoCS consortium analysed three countries in each of the four EvoCS regions. D5.2 is the case study report on the West Mediterranean EU which analysed the countries of Italy, Spain and Malta and combined the results into a regional analysis. The case study also includes recommendations for security stakeholders, based on these results.

²² All deliverables are available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables>

8. D6.2 “Case Study on Eastern EU border” **(analytical)**: Similar to D5.2. D6.2 is the case study report on the Eastern EU border region which analysed the countries of Poland, Hungary and Lithuania and combined the results into a regional analysis. The case study also includes recommendations for security stakeholders, based on these results.
9. D7.2 “Case Study on North-West Europe” **(analytical)**: Similar to D5.2. D7.2 is the case study report on the North-West Europe region which analysed the countries of UK, France and the Netherlands and combined the results into a regional analysis. The case study also includes recommendations for security stakeholders, based on these results.
10. D8.2 “Case Study on South-Eastern Europe” **(analytical)**: Similar to D5.2. D8.2 is the case study report on the South-Eastern Europe region which analysed the countries of Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey and combined the results into a regional analysis. The case study also includes recommendations for security stakeholders, based on these results.
11. D4.2 “Case Studies Report Compendium” **(analytical)**: This deliverable analyses the deliverables D5.2, D6.2, D7.2 and D8.2 together and notes on similarities and differences between the case studies. It is the document that binds the case studies into one common report.
12. D4.3 “Final Methodology review and Recommendations” **(methodological)**: In this deliverable, the feedback on the analytical framework, which was given during the preparation of the case study reports, was systematically collected and analysed. It includes recommendations as to how future analysis using the EvoCS methodology should be conducted.
13. D9.1 “Final report” **(analytical and methodological)**